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ESCAPING THE FINGERPRINT CRISIS: A
BLUEPRINT FOR ESSENTIAL RESEARCH
Meghan J. Ryan*

There is afingerprintcrisis in the courts. Judges andjurors regularly
convict criminal defendants based on fingerprint evidence, but there are
serious questions about the accuracy and reliability of this evidence. The

few studies delving into the accuracy and reliabilityoffingerprintexaminers' work suggest a high error rate and demonstrate that, when faced with
the sameprints under different conditions, fingerprintexaminersfrequently
reach different results than they previously reached. Further, there is no
scientific basisfor fingerprintmatching. It is unknown whether and to what
extent fingerprintsare unique; the degree to which fingerprintschange under variousforces relevant to the creation of latentfingerprintsremains a
mystery; and computerizedfingerprintmatching algorithms are even less
successful than the questionablesubjective matching methods offingerprint
examiners. This Article chartsa scientific escapefrom the debacle, explaining that lawyers must work hand-in-hand with scientists to determine
whether they can build a scientificfoundationforfingerprint evidence. Detailedresearchon the uniquenessoffingerprints, the biomechanics of touch,
and computerized matching algorithms is central to this endeavor, and
more robust studies aboutfingerprint examiners' accuracy and reliability
could also be useful. If researcherspursue these four tracks of essential
research, courts can dig their way out of this existingfingerprintcrisis.

*

Associate Dean for Research, Robert G. Storey Distinguished Faculty Fellow, Gerald J. Ford Research

Fellow, Altshuler Distinguished Teaching Professor, and Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law. I am grateful to questions and comments I received on this draft and related projects from
Rachel Barkow, Erin Murphy, Jeff Fagan, Tracey Meares, Rachel Harmon, Bernard Harcourt, Paul Butler, Sha-

ron Dolovich, Dan Richman, David Sklansky, John Pfaff, Josh Kleinfeld, Kate Levine, Adi Leibovitch, Anna
Lvovsky, Crystal Yang, Bennett Capers, Miriam Baer, Andrew Ferguson, Frank Bowman, Rick Garnett, Steve

Smith, Bruce Huber, Sadie Blanchard, John Robinson, Jenia Turner, Hillel Bavli, the faculty at the University of
Notre Dame Law School and the University of Missouri School of Law, and the participants in the Columbia
Criminal Justice Roundtable. Special thanks to James Loudermilk and Jack Ryan for their technical expertise,
and to Tr6 Welch, who is collaborating with me on an interdisciplinary project examining fingerprint deformation
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Fingerprint evidence is not what it seems. Popular television shows like
CSI: Crime Scene Investigation depict fingerprint evidence as infallible, and fin-

gerprint examiners regularly testify that their fingerprint matches are 100% accurate. 1 Further, judges consistently admit fingerprint examiners' testimony in

court, and juries regularly convict criminal defendants based on fingerprint evidence. 2 But beneath the surface lies an insidious truth: fingerprint evidence
stands on a shaky foundation. Despite claims by fingerprint examiners to the
contrary, the practice of matching latent fingerprints found at a crime scene to
the exemplar prints that an individual has on file is not based on science.3 First,
there are real questions about the extent to which individuals' fingerprints are
even unique such that they are useful for the purpose of identification. 4 Second,
there is little scientific research establishing a methodology to accurately match
fingerprints. 5 Further, the very limited research on fingerprint matching has not

clearly established that the current practice of matching latent prints to exemplar
prints is accurate or reliable. 6
Perhaps even more shocking than the unscientific nature of fingerprint
matching and the related concerns about accuracy and reliability is that this
should not be news to key players in the criminal justice system; yet fingerprint

1.

See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: APATH

FORWARD 48, 141- 42 (2009) [hereinafter STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE]; cf generally Simon A. Cole,

IndividualizationIs Dead, Long Live Individualization!Reforms ofReporting Practicesfor FingerprintAnalysis
in

the Un ited States, 13 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 117 (2014) (providing an overview of how fingerprint testi-

mony-by at least some examiners-has changed over the years but suggesting that it makes little difference).
This Article refers to "fingerprint matching," but it focuses primarily on matching latent fingerprints rather than
on tenprint matching. See infra text accompanying notes 47-49.

2.

See infra Section IIIB.

3.

See STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 1, at 142-45; infra Part IV.

4.

See infra Section IV.B.

5.

See infra Sections IV.C-D.

6.

See infra Section IV.A.
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evidence continues to serve as a basis for criminal convictions. Prosecutors routinely present fingerprint examiners' testimony in court, the examiners often tes-

tify to the certainty of their match conclusions, judges continue to admit that
testimony, and judges and jurors regularly convict criminal defendants based
upon this unscientific, unproven evidence. 7 When defendants raise objections to
fingerprint evidence in criminal cases, judges generally have one of two responses: They either apply a perfunctory Daubert- or Frye-type evaluation and
conclude with little analysis that fingerprint evidence is indeed reliable evidence,
or else they conclude that a reliability analysis under Daubertor Frye is not even
applicable because fingerprint evidence has such a long historical pedigree of
being used in the criminal justice system. 8 Concerningly, "scientific" evidence
like this seems to regularly receive less scrutiny in the criminal context than in
the civil one despite more being at stake-a defendant's life or liberty rather than
just money.9
The questions surrounding fingerprint evidence, paired with its continued

prominent use in criminal cases, has created a crisis in the courts. Are innocent
defendants being falsely identified and even wrongfully convicted based on this
questionable evidence? Perhaps the best-known story of an inaccurate identification by fingerprint evidence is the false identification of Brandon Mayfield as
the Madrid train bomber in 2004.10 Mayfield, an Oregon attorney and Muslim

convert, was held for two weeks for the train-bombing terrorist attack that killed
191 people. 1 1 He was implicated based almost entirely on fingerprint evidence.

12

Authorities found a latent fingerprint on a bag containing bomb materials that
was near the crime scene.

13

The FBI's Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identi-

fication System ("IAFIS") 14 identified Mayfield's print, which was in the FBI
database, as a possible match to this latent print, and an FBI fingerprint examiner
subsequently manually matched the latent print to Mayfield's exemplar print,

7.
8.

See infra Section IIIB.
See infra Section IIIB.

9.

For further analysis of this issue, see Meghan J. Ryan, The Misguided Case ofCivil v. CriminalScien-

tific Evidence Standards, manuscript (SMU Working Paper, 2019) (on file with author).
10.

See generally OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., A REVIEW OF THE FBI'S HANDLING OF THE BRANDON

MAYFIELD CASE 1 (2016) [hereinafter MAYFIELD REV.] (describing the incident); Sarah Kershaw et al., Spain
and

U.S.

at

Odds

on

Mistaken

Terror Arrest,

N.Y.

TIMES

(June

times.com/2004/06/05/us/spain-and-us-at-odds-on-mistaken-terror-arrest.html
11.

5,

2004),

https://www.ny-

(same).

See MAYFIELD REV., supra note 10, at 1-2; Elaine Sciolino, Bombings in Madrid: The Attack; 10

Bombs Shatter Trains in Madrid, Killing 192, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/ 12/world/bombings-in-madrid-the-attack-10-bombs-shatter-trains-in-madrid-killing192.html.
12. See MAYFIELD REV., supra note 10, at 1-3.
13.

See id. at 1; Kershaw, supra note 10.

14.

The FBI has since decommissioned IAFIS and now uses "Advanced Fingerprint Identification Tech-

nology" ("AFIT") as part of its larger "Next Generation Identification System" ("NGI"). Alice Lipowicz, FBI
Deploys Faster FingerprintID System, GCN (Mar. 9, 2011), https:/gen.com/articles/2011/03/09/fbi-deploysfaster-fingerprint-identification-system.aspx; Ellen Messmer, FBI Turns Up Faster, More Accurate Fingerprint

Identification System,

NETWORK WORLD (Mar. 8, 2011), https://www.networkworld.com/article/2201167/fbi-

turns-up-faster--more-accurate-fingerprint-identification-system.html.
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concluding that Mayfield's print was a 100% match to the latent print. 15 Two
additional FBI fingerprint examiners, as well as a court-appointed independent
examiner, verified this match conclusion. 16 The FBI opened an investigation into
Mayfield, and, although it discovered he was Muslim, was married to an Egyptian immigrant, had contacts with suspected terrorists, and had represented a convicted terrorist in a child custody dispute, the FBI found nothing linking Mayfield to the bombing. 17 In fact, Mayfield did not have a valid passport, and he
had apparently not left the United States since the 1990s. 18 Further, the Spanish
National Police determined that Mayfield's print was not a match to the latent
print found at the crime scene. 19 After discussing the matter with the FBI, the
Spanish National Police vowed to reassess whether the prints were a match.20 In
the meantime, the FBI detained Mayfield and intensified its investigation into
him.2 1 Subsequently, the court appointed an independent fingerprint examinera renowned expert in the field-to compare the latent print to Mayfield's exemplar print, and the expert concurred with the FBI that the prints were a match.22
That same day, though, the Spanish National Police alerted the FBI that it had
matched the latent print to someone else-an Algerian national.23 After Mayfield
was released to home detention, the FBI once again reviewed its match determination and finally reversed its conclusion. 24
Although Mayfield was not wrongfully convicted based on the erroneous
fingerprint identification, others have not been so lucky. Since 1989, there have
been 623 known wrongful convictions based on faulty forensic evidence, 25 and
about 3% of these were convictions based on fingerprint evidence. 26 As commentators have explained, these figures likely drastically underestimate the number of people actually wrongfully convicted, and underestimates are likely exacerbated when a conviction is based on fingerprint evidence because courts are
unlikely to look skeptically at fingerprint evidence even though it has a shaky

15.

See Application for Material Witness Order and Warrant Regarding Witness: Brandon Bieri Mayfield,

In re Federal Grand Jury Proceedings 03-01, 337 F. Supp. 2d 1218 (D. Or. 2004) (No. 04-MC-9071).
16. See Mayfield v. United States, 599 F.3d 964, 966-67 (9th Cir. 2010); MAYFIELD REV., supra note 10,
at 2 ("This conclusion was verified by a second LPU examiner and reviewed by a Unit Chief in the LPU, who
concurred with the identification.").
17. MAYFIELD REV., supranote 10, at 2.
18. See Mayfield v. United States, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1033 (D. Or. 2007), vacated by Mayfield, 599
F.3d 964; MAYFIELD REV., supra note 10, at 58.
19.

See Kershaw et al., supra note 10.

20.
21.
22.

See MAYFIELD REV., supra note 10, at 2.
The FBI held Mayfield as a material witness. See id. at 2-3.
See id. at 3.

23.

Id.; Kershaw, supra note 10.

24.

See MAYFIELD REV., supra note 10, at 3.

25.

See Browse Cases, NAT'L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exonera-

tion/Pages/detaillist.aspx (last visited Apr. 18, 2020) (listing exoneration cases in which the underlying convic24

tion involved false or misleading forensic evidence). This accounts for approximately
% of known wrongful
convictions. See id.
26. See id.; see also infratext accompanying notes 88-95. Note that this percentage is variable. In March
of 2019, a slightly greater percentage of known wrongful convictions based on faulty forensic evidence were
convictions based on fingerprint evidence.
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scientific foundation. 27 In recent years, courts have reversed or vacated convictions based on other questionable forensic evidence, though. 28 Bite mark evidence, for example, has come under considerable scrutiny, and several defendants who were convicted based on bite mark evidence have since been
exonerated.29 But judges do not seem as concerned about fingerprint evidence.
There are a few reasons why judges might admit fingerprint evidence at
trial even though there are real questions about its accuracy and reliability as
evidence. One possibility is that judges simply are unaware that serious questions
exist about the accuracy and reliability of fingerprint match determinations-that
fingerprint examiners regularly produce false positive and false negative match
conclusions, that they are inconsistent in these determinations and have an interrater reliability problem, and that the discipline is not built upon a scientific foundation. 30 At this point, though, lack of knowledge seems unlikely. Questions
about the accuracy and reliability of fingerprint evidence have become fairly
widely known within the criminal justice community. 3 1 Another possibility is

that judges simply do not believe that there could be real questions about the
accuracy or reliability of fingerprint evidence and are unwilling to even entertain
this possibility. Such a position may be based on the habit of admitting such
evidence for well over a century, 32 but this position also likely is buttressed by a
concern-whether conscious or unconscious-that if one gives in to the accuracy
and reliability questions of fingerprint evidence, the system could very well collapse. First, there are an overwhelming number of individuals in prison whose
convictions were based at least in part on fingerprint evidence. 33 Will courts have
to review all of these cases ifjudges conclude that fingerprint evidence is actually
inaccurate or unreliable? Second, considering fingerprint evidence is often the
primary evidence upon which criminal defendants are convicted, 34 will the effectiveness of achieving important convictions in the criminal justice system
27. See infra Part III.
28. See, e.g., Ex parte Chaney, 563 S.W.3d 239, 274-78 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (finding the petitioner
"actually innocent" where his conviction was based on bite mark evidence).
29. See All Cases, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/all-cases/#bitemark-analysis
(last visited Apr. 7, 2020) (displaying a set of cases that involved faulty bitemark analyses); NAT'L REGISTRY OF
EXONERATIONS, supra note 25 (displaying cases filtered out by "bitemark"); see, e.g., Ex parte Chaney, 563

S.W.3d at 274-78 (finding the petitioner "actually innocent" where his conviction was based on bite mark evidence); In re Richards, 371 P.3d 195, 207-08, 211 (Cal. 2016) (granting habeas relief for a conviction based on
bite mark evidence). It is important to note that these exonerations have generally not been based solely on the
unreliability of bite mark evidence, though. In In re Richards, for example, the bite mark expert from trial had
repudiated his testimony and the petitioner was able to offer additional expert testimony suggesting that the bite
mark evidence against him was unreliable. See In re Richards, 371 P.3d at 207-08. In Ex parte Chaney, the

prosecution conceded that the bite mark evidence in the case was faulty and did not constitute proof of guilt in
the case. See Ex parte Chaney, 563 S.W.3d at 258.
30. See infra Part IV.
31. See infra Part III.
32. See United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 990 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d
215, 238 (3d Cir. 2004); see also STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 1, at 136 ("Fingerprints, palm
prints, and sole prints have been used to identify people for more than a century in the United States.").
33.

See generally STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 1 (discussing the role of forensic sci-

ence evidence, including fingerprint evidence, in criminal cases).
34. See generally id.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

768

[Vol. 2020

plummet? Avoiding wrongful convictions-based on fingerprint or even other

questionable evidence-is critical, but one should not overlook the importance
of punishing guilty offenders. The legitimacy of criminal law depends on it.
These concerns are real. As at least one judge has privately asked, why should
judges exclude fingerprint evidence when there is no clear-cut evidence that it is
not accurate or reliable? 3 5 From the perspective of criminal defenders across the
country, this position may be shocking because evidentiary rules ordinarily provide that only reliable scientific testimony and evidence is admissible. 36 But, if
judges continue to think this way, it is important to address this concern as well.
This Article focuses on finding a scientific escape from many of these concerns by setting forth an agenda for research that scientists, hand-in-hand with
lawyers, should conduct to finally determine whether there is a scientific basis
for fingerprint examination that would make the practice useful for identifications. The science could completely disprove the utility of the practice, but, more
likely, it will show how this discipline can be vastly improved to provide greater
accuracy and reliability, as well as provide probabilities associated with determining how much weight decisionmakers should give fingerprint evidence. De-

spite the growing awareness within the criminal justice community about the
questions swirling around fingerprint evidence, much of the general public re-

mains unaware of the accuracy and reliability issues at stake with this type of
evidence. 37 This includes scientists. Because the general public, and scientists
too, often assume that there is satisfactory science shoring up the practice of fingerprint matching, there has been little movement within the scientific community to research questions related to the practice. 38 The criminal justice system's
heavy reliance on this questionable practice, however, highlights the necessity of
lawyers and scientists collaborating to push forward this agenda.
This Article outlines four main tracks of essential research. The first is studying how consistent fingerprint examiners are-and how accurate they are-in
their conclusions. 39 The recent awareness of the problems with fingerprint evidence has spurred some small studies along this track 40 -with mixed resultsbut there is more work to do here. This Article suggests how to improve on the
existing studies. The second track of essential research relates to individualization. There is surprisingly little research assessing whether each individual has a
unique fingerprint. 41 Examining this question is in some ways more difficult than

looking at individualization in the DNA context, but this Article proposes some
useful avenues of inquiry here. The third track of necessary research is investigating the biomechanics of touch (and other related variables) as they relate to
35.

Author conversation with anonymous judge.

36.

See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 702 (providing that "[a] witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge,

skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if," among other things,
"the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data," "the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods," and "the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case").
37. See infra Part III.
38. See infra Part IV.
39. See infra Section IV.A.
40.

See infra text accompanying notes 184-214.

41.

See infra Section IV.B.
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fingerprints. 42 Fingers deform when they press against surfaces, and how they
deform can relate to variables such as the shape of the surface on which they are
pressed and the force with which they are pressed.43 This Article proposes a
handful of experiments to further explore how the biomechanics of touch affect
fingerprints. Finally, the last essential research track is building effective computerized matching programs. 44 In other disciplines, there has been a fair amount
of effort put into developing computer programs that can match one image to
another. 45 This matching is complicated with respect to fingerprints, though, because there is need for a computer program that can accurately identify and quantify the degree of difference between two similar images. The difference between,
for example, an exemplar print and a latent print found at a crime scene could
result from the simple biomechanics of touch or from the fact that the prints were
derived from different individuals. 46 It would be useful to measure this difference to help determine the probability that the prints originated with the same
individual.
By setting forth this ambitious research agenda, I hope that this Article
spurs collaboration between lawyers and the scientific community to conduct the
necessary research so that we can finally find an escape from the current fingerprint crisis. This research should provide significant insight into whether fingerprint examination is a useful enterprise offering accurate and reliable information
or whether it is pure junk science.
II.

THE MECHANICS OF FINGERPRINT MATCHING

Modern fingerprint analysis is not as straightforward as is presented on tel-

evision and in the movies. There are basically two types of fingerprint examination. 47 In "tenprint"examinations, authorities capture images of all ten of an individual's prints, which are then often compared to other prints on file. 48 In latent
print examinations, the authorities find a latent print at a crime scene, capture the
print, and compare the print to exemplar prints on file. 49 Tenprint examinations
usually take place when an individual has been arrested and is being processed. 5
Latent print examinations are generally employed when attempting to uncover

the identity of the perpetratorfrom evidence found at a crime scene.51 This second type of fingerprint examination is often more difficult because of the
42.

See infra Section IV.C.

43.

See STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 1, at 137.

44.
45.

See infra Section IV.D.
See infra Section IV.D.

46.

See STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 1, at 137-38.

47.

See Anil K. Jain & Jianjiang Feng, Latent FingerprintMatching, 33 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON PATTERN

ANALYSIS & MACHINE INTELLIGENCE 88, 88 (2011); Kristi Mayo, AFISInteroperability, EVIDENCE TECH. MAG.,

Jan-Feb.
48.
49.
50.
JUST,

2008.
See Jain & Feng, supra note 47, at 88.
See id.
See id.; Kenneth R. Moses et al., Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems (AFIS), NAT'L INST.

THE

FINGERPRINT

SOURCEBOOK

6-9

https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/225320.pdf
51. See Jain & Feng, supra note 47, at 88.

to

6-10

(2011)

(Alan

McRoberts

ed.,

2011),
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decreased quality and quantity of the latent prints available for comparison.
Moreover, while authorities acquire exemplar prints under at least somewhat
controlled conditions, individuals create latent prints under generally unknown
conditions. 53 This translates into latent prints that can significantly differ from
the exemplar prints on file, making match determinations more difficult. 54
Unlike what one might see on CSI: Crime Scene Investigation, attempting
to match a latent print to an exemplar print on file is generally a two-part process.
First, a latent print is compared to suspects' prints or electronically run against a

database of known prints-prints associated with particular individuals-using
an automated fingerprint identification system ("AFIS").5 5 Employing a proprietary computerized algorithm, the AFIS generates the closest possible matches
to the latent print. 56 Some jurisdictions have access to both their local database
of known prints and also the more extensive federal database of known prints.
The FBI maintains a large database within its Next Generation Identification sys-

tem, which includes fingerprints for more than 120 million people. 58 Not all police departments have the luxury of easily employing this database, though, as
gaining access to the database can take time, and maintaining local terminals that
can communicate with the FBI system can be expensive.59

After an AFIS arms examiners with one or more possible matches to the
latent print, the fingerprint examiners engage in a manual study of the latent print
and the relevant exemplar print(s), 60 analyzing the characteristics of the prints to
determine whether they are similar enough to conclude that they are a match. 61
Today, fingerprint examiners in the United States typically analyze prints using

52.

See id. at 88-90. Latent prints are usually of low quality, often lack significant overlapping area with

the exemplar print on file, may appear on a complex background that makes it difficult for the system to pick up
the print alone, and are affected by nonlinear distortion. See id.
53.
See STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 1, at 137.
54. See id. at 137-40.
55. See id. at 139, 269; Moses et al., supra note 50, at 6-27.
56.

See Interview with James Loudermilk, Senior Dir. for Innovation and Customer Solutions, IDEMIA

Nat'l Sec. Solutions (July 15, 2019). Of course, it is the computerized algorithm that culls the "closest" prints
from the database, so these prints are the closest according to the algorithm, see Moses et al., supra note 50, at
6-28, which does not necessarily mean that these prints are the closest according to all methods of comparison.
57. See STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 1, at 270-71.
58.

See E-mail from James Loudermilk, Senior Dir. for Innovation and Customer Solutions, IDEMIA Nat'l

Sec. Solutions, to Meghan J. Ryan, Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law

(Apr. 29, 2020, 17:15 CDT) (on file with author). In recent years, NGI replaced IAFIS. See ForensicDatabase
Biometrics Table, NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH. (Jan. 9, 2017), https://www.nist.gov/oles/forensic-database-biometrics-table (last visited Apr. 7, 2020); supra note 14.
59.
See STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 1, at 270-71; E-mail from James Loudermilk,
supra note 58; Interview with James Loudermilk, supra note 56; see also William Jackson, Law Enforcement,

NISTMaking FingerprintFilesEasier to Search, GCN (Mar. 25, 2013), https://gen.com/articles/2013/03/25/afisfingerprint-matching-standards.aspx (describing the incompatibility between AFIS terminals and efforts to "enable interoperable searches between law enforcement agencies using AFIS solutions from different vendors").
60.

See STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 1, at 139 ("Although some Automated Fingerprint

Identification Systems (AFIS) permit fully automated identification of fingerprint records related to criminal
history (e.g., for screening job applicants), the assessment of latent prints from crime scenes is based largely on
human interpretation.").

61.

See id.
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an ACE-V-Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation, and Verification-approach. 62
This involves assessing the quality and quantity of detail in the latent print and
considering the skin's condition, residue that may be present, mechanical deformation of the print, the type of surface touched, the method used to capture the
print, and the percentage of the print captured. 63 Each of these factors can affect
the details and shape of the print. 64 Examiners compare the latent print to an
exemplar print, looking at details such as ridge flows, ridge counts, the shape of
the print's core, delta locations, delta shape, scar shapes, and crease patterns. 65
They then evaluate whether there are enough similarities between the latent and
exemplar print to declare a match.66 There is not a standard number of similarities that examiners must find to declare a match; instead the examiner's own
experience should inform his or her opinion about whether there is sufficient
agreement between the prints to reach such a conclusion. 67 Moreover, fingerprint
examiners often simply conclude whether their evaluations resulted in identification or exclusion, or whether they were inconclusive. 68 Standard analysis in
this area does not include assessing error rates such as in DNA analysis. 69 Finally,
there is a verification step-at least in some laboratories-by which another examiner determines whether he or she agrees with the original examiner's
62.

See id. at 137.

63.

See id. at 137-38; Lyn Haber & Ralph Norman Haber, Scientific Validation of FingerprintEvidence

Under Daubert, 7 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 87, 90 (2008).
64.

See STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 1, at 137-38; Haber & Haber, supra note 63, at

65.

See STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 1, at 138; Haber & Haber, supra note 63, at 90.

66.

See STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 1, at 138; Haber & Haber, supra note 63, at 91.

67.

See STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 1, at 139. As NAS relates:

90.

[T]he ACE-V method does not specify particular measurements or a standard test protocol, and examiners
must make subjective assessments throughout. In the United States, the threshold for making a source identification is deliberately kept subjective, so that the examiner can take into account both the quantity and
quality of comparable details. As a result, the outcome of a friction ridge analysis is not necessarily repeatable from examiner to examiner.
Id.
68. See id. at 141 (noting that "[the Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and
Technology (SWGFAST)] has promulgated three acceptable conclusions resulting from latent print comparison:
individualization (or identification), exclusion, or inconclusive").
69. See, e.g., People v. Pettis, No. 4-18-0328, 2019 WL 441958, at *4 (Ill. App. Jan. 31, 2019) ("Moore
testified her comparison of a fingerprint on exhibit T and the latent fingerprint resulted in a match, indicating the
same person made both prints."); State v. Martinez, No. A-1-CA-35021, 2018 WL 3867856, at *2, 4-5 (N.M. Ct.
App. July 31, 2018) (stating that the police officer "match[ed] four different latent prints to four fingers on [Martinez's] ten-print card . . . [and] testified that he was one hundred percent certain that it was a match, and that, if
he felt that he was not certain, then he would not have called it an identification"); STRENGTHENING FORENSIC

SCIENCE, supra note 1, at 141-42 (explaining that, because statistical models are insufficient, "the friction ridge
community actively discourages its members from testifying in terms of the probability of a match"); see also
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 1, at 143 ("Some in the latent print community argue that the

method itself, if followed correctly (i.e., by well-trained examiners properly using the method), has a zero error
rate. Clearly, this assertion is unrealistic, and, moreover, it does not lead to a process of method improvement.");
Brandon Garrett & Gregory Mitchell, How Jurors EvaluateFingerprintEvidence: The Relative Importance of
Match Language, Method Information, and Error Acknowledgment, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 484, 485
(2013) ("At a criminal trial involving fingerprint evidence, a fingerprint examiner will typically testify that she
followed a standard procedure for comparing prints recovered from the crime scene to reference sample prints
and opine that this procedure resulted in a conclusion that the defendant was the source of the crime scene
prints .... ").
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reasoning and conclusion. 70 Importantly, the second examiner is generally not
blinded from the original examiner's conclusion in reaching his or her own results. 7 1 Further, the original examiner is generally not blinded from information
the authorities have about the suspects at issue in the case and the sources of the
exemplar prints.7 2
III. THE FINGERPRINT CRISIS

Fingerprint matching has come under heavy scrutiny in recent years. At the
federal level, the National Academy of Sciences ("NAS"), as well as the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology ("PCAST"), have offered
sharp criticism of the practice, emphasizing the lack of a scientific foundation
for fingerprint matching. 73 Yet courts continue to admit testimony from fingerprint examiners, and courts and juries continue to convict criminal defendants
based on this evidence. This creates a significant concern about wrongful identifications and convictions, but the practice persists.
A.

Questions About Accuracy and Reliability

Unlike DNA analysis, which developed in the research laboratories of universities, fingerprint examination sprouted from the forensic needs of police departments and was cultivated in that environment alongside other forensic disciplines like ballistics and hair analysis. 74 And just like their distinct origins, DNA
analysis and fingerprint matching have very different foundations. DNA analysis
is based on years of rigorous scientific research.7' Fingerprint matching lacks
any indicia of a scientific foundation.
70.

See STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 1, at 138; Haber & Haber, supra note 63, at 91.

71.

See Haber & Haber, supra note 63, at 97 ("[M]ost verification testing in crime laboratories is non-

blind, which permits contamination and bias to reduce the chances of detecting errors . .

."); see also

STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 1, at 138 ("Verification occurs when another qualified examiner

repeats the observations and comes to the same conclusion, although the second examiner may be aware of the
conclusion of the first.").
72. See Itiel E. Dror, Biases in ForensicExperts, 360 SCI. 243, 243 (2018) ("Forensic experts are too often
exposed to irrelevant contextual information, largely because they work with the police and prosecution. Extraneous information-from a suspect's ethnicity or criminal record to eyewitness identifications, confessions, and
other lines of evidence-can potentially cause bias."); Itiel E. Dror et al., ContextualInformationRenders Experts
Vulnerable to Making Erroneous Identifications, 156 FORENSIC SCI. INT'L 74, 77 (2006) ("Our study shows that
it is possible to alter identification decisions on the same fingerprint, solely by presenting it in a different context.").
73.

See STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 1, at 142 (stating that fingerprint examiners'

claims of infallibility are "notscientifically plausible"); PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. AND TECH.,
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS

95-96 (2016) [hereinafter PCAST REP.] (emphasizing the potentially high error rates of the subjective practice
of fingerprint matching).
74.

Compare Stephen

Mayhew,

History

of Biometrics, BIOMETRIC

UPDATE,

https://www.bio-

metricupdate.com/201802/history-of-biometrics-2 (last visited Apr. 7, 2020) (explaining that fingerprint identification practices grew out of police departments), with STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 1, at 41
(stating that "DNA analysis . .. originally developed in research laboratories in the context of life sciences research").
75. See STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 1, at 40-41.
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In 2009, NAS issued a report-StrengtheningForensic Science in the
United States: A Path Forward-heavily criticizing almost every forensic sci-

ence discipline except for DNA analysis. 76 Fingerprint (and other friction ridge)
analysis was no exception. 77 The report explains that there has been insufficient
research to support the discipline of fingerprint analysis. 78 In particular, the authors were concerned about the subjectivity involved in fingerprint examinations, 79 the flexibility in methodology among examiners, 80 and the lack of scientific evidence supporting the ACE-V method.8 1 After its analysis, the authors
concluded:
Historically, friction ridge analysis [including fingerprint examination] has
served as a valuable tool, both to identify the guilty and to exclude the innocent. Because of the amount of detail available in friction ridges, it seems
plausible that a careful comparison of two impressions can accurately discern whether or not they had a common source. Although there is limited
information about the accuracy and reliability of friction ridge analyses,
claims that these analyses have zero error rates are not scientifically
plausible. 82

This was a gracious conclusion considering the lack of sufficient research to
shore up current practices of fingerprint analysis.

PCAST, while also criticizing fingerprint analysis, was similarly rather
charitable:
PCAST finds that latent fingerprint analysis is a foundationally valid subjective methodology-albeit with a false positive rate that is substantial
and is likely to be higher than expected by many jurors based on longstanding claims about the infallibility of fingerprint analysis. The false-positive
rate could be as high as 1 error in 306 cases based on the FBI study and 1

error in 18 cases based on a study by another crime laboratory. In reporting
results of latent-fingerprint examination, it is important to state the falsepositive rates based on properly designed validation studies. 83
Aside from expressing concern about accuracy, PCAST noted that the practice
of fingerprint examination faces some additional major challenges, including
confirmation bias, contextual bias, and a lack of proficiency studies.8 4 Validity
of the practice, PCAST explained, depends upon addressing these important

76.

See generally id. at 127-82 (criticizing various forensic science disciplines).

77.

See id. at 136-45. The report classifies fingerprint analysis as a form of "friction ridge analysis." Id. at

136. Friction ridge analysis also includes the examination of palm and sole prints. See id.
78. See id. at 142-45.
79. See id. at 139.
80. See id. at 141.
81.

that they
82.
83.
84.

See STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 1, at 143 (quoting Haber & Haber, who concluded

had "reviewed available scientific evidence of the validity of the ACE-V method and found none").
Id. at 142.
PCAST REP., supra note 73, at 9-10.
See id. at 10.
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issues. 85 In addition to these stated deficiencies, however, there is the looming

concern of a lack of research validating the practice in general. 86
As would be expected in a discipline not based on scientific research, there
are several known cases of wrongful conviction and wrongful identification
based on fingerprint evidence. Brandon Mayfield is not the only one who has
suffered as a consequence of the broad use of fingerprint evidence in court. 87
Stephan Cowans served six and a half years of a thirty- to forty-five-year sentence for a murder conviction based largely on fingerprint evidence. 88 Multiple
fingerprint examiners were involved in the case and concluded that Cowans's
print was a match to a latent print found at the crime scene. 89 Post-conviction
DNA evidence later exonerated Cowans, though, suggesting the conclusion that
his fingerprint was a match to the latent print was erroneous. 90 In another case,
an individual-Richard Jackson-was convicted of murdering his lover, Alvin
Davis. 91 A supposedly matching fingerprint was the only evidence supporting

the conviction, and Jackson was sentenced to life in prison. 92 Three fingerprint
examiners had concluded that Jackson's fingerprint was a match to a print found
at the scene of the crime. 93 At trial, Jackson's defense counsel put two of its own
experts on the stand who testified that Jackson's fingerprint was not a match to
the latent print, but this did not persuade the jury. 94 Jackson was later excluded
as the source of the latent print, and Jackson was released from prison after serving two years. 95

Despite these stories, it remains unclear exactly how many individuals have
been wrongfully convicted based on faulty fingerprint evidence. There are only
about two dozen generally known cases like this, 96 but, for a number of reasons,
85.
86.

See id.
See id. at 10-11.

87.

See supra text accompanying notes 10-24.

88.

See Simon A. Cole, More Than Zero:Accounting for Errorin Latent Fingerprint

Identification, 95 J.

CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985, 986-87 (2005) ("In January, Stephan Cowans was freed after serving six and a

half years of a 30- to 45-year sentence for shooting and wounding a police officer. Cowans had been convicted
solely on fingerprint and eyewitness evidence, but post-conviction DNA testing showed that Cowans was not the
perpetrator."); Stephan Cowans, INNOCENCE PROJECT [hereinafter Cowans, INNOCENCE PROJECT],
https://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/stephan-cowans/
MICH.:

NAT'L

(last visited Apr. 7, 2020); Stephan Cowans, UNIV.

REGISTRY

EXONERATIONS [hereinafter Cowans, NAT'L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS],
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3127
(last visited Apr. 7, 2020).

Cowans's conviction was also based on erroneous eyewitness testimony. See Id.
89.

See Cole, supra note 88, at 986-87; Cowans, INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 88; Cowans, NAT'L

REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, supra note 88.
90.

See Cole, supra note 88, at 986-87; Cowans, INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 88; Cowans, NAT'L

REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, supra note 88.
91.

See Cole, supra note 88, at 1011.

92.

See id.; RichardJackson, NAT'L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exon-

eration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3318 (last visited Apr. 7, 2020).
93.

See Cole, supra note 88, at 1011; RichardJackson, supra note 92.

94.

See Cole, supra note 88, at 1011; RichardJackson, supra note 92.

95.

See Cole, supra note 88, at 1011; RichardJackson, supra note 92.

96. See Cole, supra note 88, at 997-1016, 1067-70 tbl. 1 (identifying twenty-two cases of wrongful conviction or identification based on fingerprint evidence). Authorities continue to uncover cases of erroneous fingerprint match determinations, however. For example, in 2012, a fingerprint examiner in Lana Canen's case

changed his match opinion about the latent print at issue, which led to Canen's exoneration. See Lana Canen,
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it is exceedingly difficult to identify such cases. Experts have explained that exoneration numbers overall almost certainly underestimate the true number of
wrongful convictions. 97 Further, such underestimates are probably greater where
fingerprint evidence is involved, because judges and juries generally consider
fingerprint evidence very persuasive. 98 As Simon Cole has said, "No forensic
expert witness can more convincingly place a suspect at the scene of crime than

the latent fingerprint examiner .... Juries have consistently shown themselves
willing to convict on fingerprint evidence alone, and such convictions have been
upheld by the courts." 99 Indeed, prosecutors have been using fingerprint evidence to convict defendants for more than a century.100 Moreover, this acute persuasiveness of fingerprint evidence certainly has an effect on plea-bargaining, as
deals are struck in the shadow of what is possible at trial. 10 1 More than 90% of

UNIV. MICH.: NAT'L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=4047 (last visited Apr. 7, 2020). Canen was released after serving seven years of a fifty-fiveyear sentence for murder. See id. In 2015, Beniah Alton Dandridge was released from prison after serving nine-

teen years of a life sentence when, due to witness recantations, the fingerprint evidence in the case was reviewed
and the latent prints were determined to belong to someone other than Dandridge. See Beniah Alton Dandridge,
UNIV. MICH.: NAT'L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casede-

tail.aspx?caseid=4768 (last visited Apr. 7, 2020).
97.

See JON B. GOULD, THE INNOCENCE COMMISSION: PREVENTING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND

RESTORING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 19 (2008); Jon B. Gould & Richard A. Leo, One Hundred Years

Later: Wrongful ConvictionsAfter a Century of Research, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 825, 834-36 (2010).
98. See Simon A. Cole, Witnessing Identification:Latent FingerprintingEvidence and ExpertKnowledge,
28 SOC. STUD., SCI. 687, 688 (1998); Sarah Lucy Cooper, Challenges to FingerprintIdentification Evidence:

Why the Courts Need a New Approach to Finality, 42 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 756, 757 (2016) ("[F]ingerprints are considered 'powerful' evidence against defendants."); James S. Liebman et al., The Evidence of Things
Not Seen: Non-Matches as Evidence ofInnocence, 98 IOWAL. REV. 577, 601 (2013) ("A fingerprint is powerful

because the collection of many tiny lines and intersections found in a latent partial fingerprint at a crime scene
match those taken from a suspect.").
99.

See Cole, supra note 98, at 688.

100. See United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 990 (10th Cir. 2009) ("Fingerprint identification has been
used extensively by law enforcement agencies all over the world for almost a century."); United States v. Calderon-Segura, 512 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 2008) ("As other courts have recognized, fingerprint identification
methods have been tested in the adversarial system for roughly a hundred years."); United States v. Mitchell, 365
F.3d 215, 238 (3d Cir. 2004); Jeffery G. Barnes, History, in NAT'L INST. JUST., supra note 50, at 1-17 to 1-19
(stating that the People v. Jenningscase in 1911 "was the first American appellate case regarding the admissibility

of fingerprint expert testimony" and that the People v. Crispi case, which was decided that same year, "is considered to be the first conviction obtained with fingerprint evidence alone in the United States").
101.

See William J. Stuntz, Privacy's Problemand the Law of CriminalProcedure,93 MICH. L. REV. 1016,

1020 (1995) ("[A]ll procedural rules have substantive effects. But it is useful to see how criminal procedure casts
its substantive shadow, and how the size and shape of that shadow depends on the interests the law chooses to
protect."); see also Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargainingin the Shadow of the Law: The Case of

Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 997 (1979) ("Individuals in a wide variety of contexts bargain in the shadow of the
law."). But cf Stephanos Bibas, Plea BargainingOutside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2464, 246667 (2004) (explaining that this shadow-of-trial model is oversimplified); William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargainingand
CriminalLaw 's DisappearingShadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2549-50 (2004) (stating that "[t]he shadow the
law casts on plea bargaining is different for different crimes and different at the federal and state levels" and
explaining that, "[f]or many crimes, law's shadow may disappear altogether . . . [and] plea bargains take place in
the shadow of prosecutors' preferences, voters' preferences, budget constraints, and other forces-but not in the
shadow of the law").
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cases end in guilty pleas rather than trial convictions, 102 and it is much more
difficult to establish one's innocence after one has pled guilty. 103 Accordingly,
the numbers of individuals wrongfully convicted-whether by trial or plea-

based on fingerprint evidence could be staggering.
B.

Admissibility

Despite the significant concerns about the accuracy and reliability of fingerprint analysis, courts continue to routinely admit expert testimony from fin-

gerprint examiners, and juries continue to rely heavily on this testimony in convicting criminal defendants. 104 Over the course of the last couple of decades,
there have been several challenges to such testimony. For example, in United
States v. Crisp,105 the defendant argued that a fingerprint expert's testimony that
the defendant's palm had produced the print on an incriminating note should be
excluded under the admissibility test for expert testimony set forth in Daubertv.
MerrellDow Pharmaceuticals,Inc. 106 In United States v. John,1 0 7 the defendant

argued that "the district court 'abdicated its gatekeeping function' by failing to
[even] hold a Dauberthearing" before admitting fingerprint testimony into evidence. 108 And in United States v. Baines,109 the defendant objected to the relia-

bility of fingerprint testimony tying him to the illegal possession of a duffel bag
full of guns and ammunition. 110 In each of these cases, the courts deftly rejected
the defendants' challenges.
Courts have uniformly dismissed these and similar challenges. In Crisp, for
example, the Fourth Circuit emphasized fingerprint evidence's long historical
pedigree in the United States, stating that "[f]ingerprint . . . analysis ha[s] long
been recognized by the courts as [a] sound method[] for making reliable identifications" and that "[f]ingerprint identification has been admissible as reliable
evidence in criminal trials in this country since at least 1911."111 Then, pursuant
102. See Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012) ("[C]riminal justice today is for the most part a system
of pleas, not a system of trials. Ninety-seven percent of federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas.").
103. See Innocents Who
Plead Guilty, NAT'L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS
1 (2015),
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/NRE.Guilty.Plea.Articlel.pdf.

As the National Reg-

istry ofExonerationshas explained:
Innocent defendants who plead guilty have an exceptionally hard time convincing anybody of their innocence, or even getting a hearing. Judges, prosecutors, police officers, journalists, friends, lawyers, even
innocence organizations are all less likely to believe in the innocence of a defendant who pleads guilty.
Procedural obstacles prevent these defendants from filing appeals, petitioning for consideration of new evidence, obtaining DNA testing.
Id.
104. See United States v. Stone, 848 F. Supp. 2d 714, 718 (E.D. Mich. 2012) ("Wholesale objections to
latent fingerprint identification evidence have been uniformly rejected by courts across the country.").
105. 324 F.3d 261 (4th Cir. 2003).
106.

See id. at 265. Although not technically fingerprint evidence, palm print evidence is very similar and

suffers from the same deficiencies.
107. 597 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2010).
108. Id. at 274.
109. 573 F.3d 979 (10th Cir. 2009).
110. See id. at 980-82.
111. Crisp, 324 F.3d at 265-66.
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to its Daubertanalysis, the court stated that "the principles underlying fingerprint
identification . . bear the imprimatur of a strong general acceptance, not only in
the expert community, but in the courts as well." 1 1 2 Accordingly, the court concluded that "wholesale exclusion of [such] a long-accepted form of expert evidence" would be a "drastic step" and applauded the district court's ruling to admit it. 113 In John, the Fifth Circuit determined that the district court was correct
in not even holding a Dauberthearing on the admissibility of the evidence because, again, "[f]ingerprint identification has been admissible as reliable evidence in criminal trials in this country since at least 1911."114 Moreover, the
court explained, "the reliability of the technique has been tested in the adversarial
system for over a century," "has been routinely subject to peer review," and, "as
a number of courts have noted, the error rate is low." 1 1 5 In Baines, the Tenth
Circuit applied a more rigorous version of the Daubert test than did the Fourth
Circuit in Crisp, but, taking into account the deferential abuse-of-discretion
standard of review, concluded that the lower court had not erred in admitting
fingerprint evidence. 116 Under Daubert,which the court emphasized is a flexible
test,11 7 the court found that: (1) fingerprint matching had not been subjected to
rigorous scientific testing but that examiner certification and proficiency tests
suggested that this testing factor "weigh[ed] somewhat in favor of admissibility,
although not powerfully"; 118 (2) the government failed to show that the peer review and publication factor favored admissibility; 119 (3) although "[t]here
may . . . be[] erroneous identifications that [have] never [come] to light," and
even though "the actual error rate for FBI examiners may be higher than" the
"one per 11 million" figure to which the government's expert testified, "the
known error rate remains impressively low" and favors admissibility; 120
(4) "[t]he ACE-V system is a procedural standard but not a substantive one," as
"[c]ritical steps in the process depend on the subjective judgment of the analyst,"
but, ultimately, "determination of this factor is not critical to our decision";1 21
and (5) "acceptance by a community of unbiased experts would carry greater
weight, [but] . . acceptance by other experts in the field," as is present here, is

112. Id. at 268.
113. Id. Although the court emphasized the importance of the long general acceptance of fingerprint evidence, it did explain that Daubert applied and briefly explained that, beyond general acceptance, fingerprint
analysis had "the requisite 'standards controlling the technique's operation"' and a "negligible error rate" that
satisfied the Daubertfactor. Id. at 269 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993)).
114. United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 274-75 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Crisp, 324 F.3d at 266).
115. Id. at 275.
116. See United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 992 (10th Cir. 2009) ("In reaching a conclusion after this
process of focusing on each of the Daubert factors in turn, we must return to two overriding principles": a deferential standard of review and the flexibility of Daubert and Kumho Tire.).
117. See id. at 989 ("The inquiry is a 'flexible one,' as Daubert itself teaches.").
118. Id. at 990.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 990-91 (emphasis added).
121. Id. at 991. The court added: "We hasten to add that subjectivity does not, in itself, preclude a finding
of reliability. But in searching this record for evidence of standards that guide and limit the analyst in exercise of
these subjective judgments, we find very little."Id.
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"overwhelming" and sufficient. 122 As Baines demonstrates, even when courts

remain truer to Daubertand apply more than perfunctory analyses like the courts
did in Crisp and John, they still end up admitting fingerprint evidence despite its
lack of scientific foundation.
In only one reported case has a judge refused to admit this testimony. In the
2002 United States v. Llera Plaza123 case, Judge Louis H. Pollak of the Eastern

District of Pennsylvania carefully examined the information presented to him on
fingerprinting techniques and analyzed the reliability of the practice under the
admissibility factors set forth in Daubert.12 4 He found that there was little scientific testing shoring up the practice, 12 5 it had not been sufficiently subjected to
the peer review process, 126 and there was no known error rate-either at the
methodological or practitioner level-or controlling standards governing the
practice.127 Ultimately, he concluded that "[t]he failure of fingerprint identifications fully to satisfy the[se] first three Daubert factors militates against heavy
reliance on the general acceptance factor" 128 and that general acceptance cannot
"by itself . .. sustain the government's burden in making the case for the admissibility of fingerprint testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702."129 In mak-

ing this determination, Judge Pollak ignored the long historical pedigree of fingerprinting on which so many judges before him had relied and found
persuasive. 130 Based upon his examination, Judge Pollak concluded that the parties could present only limited expert fingerprint testimony. 131 Their experts

could "describ[e] how any latent and rolled prints at issue in th[e] case were obtained"; "identify[], and plac[e] before the jury, such fingerprints and any necessary magnifications"; and "point[] out any observed similarities and differences
between a particular latent print and a particular rolled print alleged by the government to be attributable to the same persons." 132 Judge Pollak did not, however,
allow the parties "to present testimony expressing an opinion of an expert witness

122. Baines, 573 F.3d at 991.
123. United States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (withdrawn from bound volume),
vacated and superseded by United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
124. See Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 504-16 (analyzing the practice of fingerprint matching under
Daubert). Examining expert testimony and methods under Daubertfor admissibility involves assessing whether
the method can be or has been tested, whether it has been published and subjected to peer review, its rate of error
and whether there are standards controlling its operation, and whether it enjoys general acceptance within the
relevant scientific community. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993).
125. See Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 506-08.
126. See id. at 508-09 (asserting that, although there have been a number of publications discussing the
techniques of fingerprint identification, "it is not apparent that the[se] publication[s] constitute[] 'submission to
the scrutiny of the scientific community' in the Daubertsense" because "[e]ven those who stand at the top of the
fingerprint identification field ... tend to be skilled professionals who have learned their craft on the job and
without any concomitant advanced academic training" so "[i]t would thus be a misnomer to call fingerprint examiners a 'scientific community' in the Daubertsense" (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S at 593)).

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 509-14.
Id. at 515.
Id.
See id. at 494-517.
See Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 517-18.
Id.
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that a particular latent print matches, or does not match, the rolled print of a particular person and hence is, or is not, the fingerprint of that person." 133
Judge Pollak's decision sent reverberations throughout the criminal justice
community-but not for long. Just over two months later, Judge Pollak reversed
himself 134 In this later decision, Judge Pollak explained that, upon reconsideration, it seemed that, although fingerprint examination is not scientific, it is a technical discipline and, in that sense, there has been sufficient peer review and publication and sufficient knowledge of error rate and maintenance of standards
under Daubert.135 The "testing" factor of Daubertwas still not met, 136 but this,

he determined, would not prevent the admissibility of testimony on fingerprint
identifications. 137 "[T]o postpone present in-court utilization of this 'bedrock forensic identifier' pending such [useful] research," Judge Pollak explained,
"would be to make the best the enemy of the good." 138
Thus was the end of the brief victory by criminal defendants over the questionable practice of admitting "expert" testimony on fingerprint identifications.

Since Judge Pollak's brave analysis in his initial opinion carefully analyzing the
forensic discipline under Daubert, there have been no other even slightly successful challenges to this evidence in court. 139 Judges seem to have taken a uniform stance in admitting this evidence despite questions about the accuracy and
reliability of human fingerprint examiners and the AFISs on which they regularly
rely.

133. Id. at 518.
134. See United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002), vacatingand supersedingLlera
Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d 492. Judge Pollak's initial decision on this question of admissibility was issued on January
7, 2002. See Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 492. His later decision reversing this was issued on March 13, 2002.
See Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 549.
135. See Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 560-71.
136. See id. at 571 ("Having re-reviewed the applicability of the Daubert factors through the prism of
Kumho Tire, I conclude that the one Daubertfactor which is both pertinent and unsatisfied is the first factor'testing."').
137. See id. at 571-72.
138. Id. at 572.
139. See, e.g., United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 992 (10th Cir. 2009) ("On the whole, it seems to us
that the record supports the district judge's finding that fingerprint analysis is sufficiently reliable to be admissible.
Thus, we find no abuse of discretion."); United States v. Calderon-Segura, 512 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2008)
("The procedures adopted by the district court for determining evidentiary reliability, and for permitting the defense to inquire into the expert's qualifications and bases for his proffered opinions, were well within the court's
discretion in fulfilling its gatekeeping function. Thus, the expert testimony was properly admitted."); United
States v. Abreu, 406 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 2005) ("We agree with the decisions of our sister circuits and
hold that the fingerprint evidence admitted in this case satisfied Daubert.");United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d
215, 246 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in admitting fingerprint identification evidence); United States v. Collins, 340 F.3d 672, 682 (8th Cir. 2003) ("Fingerprint evidence and analysis
is generally accepted."); United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 269 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding that the lower court
did not abuse its discretion in admitting fingerprint identification testimony). Although this Article focuses on
federal cases, the same is true with respect to state cases.
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Although judges routinely admit fingerprint evidence, courts generally allow defense counsel to cross-examine the expert to try to expose the shortcomings of fingerprint evidence. 140 By doing this, courts state that data about the
inaccuracies and unreliability of fingerprint evidence goes to the weight of the
evidence. 141 But there are limits to what courts will allow on cross-examination.
In Gee v. United States, 142 for example, the district court refused to allow the

defense to specifically rely on the NAS report in his cross-examination of the
prosecution's fingerprint examiner. 143 Defense counsel attempted to have the report admitted as a learned treatise to be used for substantive and impeachment
purposes, but the court denied this request, finding that it disagreed with parts of
the report, as did the prosecution's fingerprint expert. 144 Even if courts do not

limit cross-examination in this way, studies show that the cross-examination of
expert witnesses often does little to change the minds of jurors, who are largely
impressed by expert witnesses and their so-called scientific evidence. 145 As a
result, relying on cross-examination to ameliorate the effects of fingerprint examiners' testimony seems to be ineffective.
Beyond cross-examination, the defense is often unable to present its own
evidence about the inaccuracies and unreliability of fingerprint evidence. As
Judge Michael explained in his dissent in Crisp:

In most criminal cases, particularly those in which the defendant is indigent,
the defendant does not have access to an independent expert who could
review the analyses and conclusions of the prosecution's expert. Lack of
money is only one problem. Lack of independent crime laboratories is another. The great majority of crime laboratories are operated by law enforcement agencies. More important, criminal defendants do not appear to have

access to experts who could challenge the basic principles and methodology of fingerprint and handwriting analysis. 146

140.

See, e.g., Baines, 573 F.3d at 983-85 (describing the defense's cross-examination regarding the errors

associated with fingerprint identifications and noting the district court's determination that defense arguments
about such errors go to the weight of the evidence, which can be addressed during cross-examination).
141. See, e.g., United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 275-76 (5th Cir. 2010) ("Issues regarding the accuracy
of fingerprint evidence in a particular case generally go 'to the weight and credibility of the evidence' and are
'best left to the finder of fact, not an appellate court.'").
142. 54 A.3d 1249 (D.C. 2012).
143.

See id. at 1253-55. The court refused to take judicial notice of the NAS report as a learned treatise.

See id. at 1268.
144. See id. at 1262-68.
145. See Erica Beecher-Monas, Reality Bites: The Illusion of Science in Bite-MarkEvidence, 30 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1369, 1407 (2009) ("Although cross-examination and the presentation of contradictory expert testimony

are the traditional cures for 'attacking shaky but admissible evidence,' expert testimony that lacks any empirical
foundation is resistant to this kind of correction."); see also Sarah Lucy Cooper, The Collision ofLaw and Science:
American Court Responses to Developments in Forensic Science, 33 PACE L. REV. 234, 262, 275 (2013) (stating

that "studies have rejected the idea that cross-examination cures 'shaky' evidence" and that "studies have found
that a vast majority of jurors agree that fingerprint identification is a 'science' and that fingerprints are the most
reliable means of identification").
146. United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 273 (4th Cir. 2003) (Michael, J., dissenting); see also SIMON A.
COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES: AHISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING AND CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION 280 (2001) (explain-

ing that is rare for the defense to challenge fingerprint evidence because it lacks the funds to hire experts and
reporting that police officers have been known to fabricate fingerprint evidence for this reason); Paul C. Giannelli,
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Aside from fingerprint examiners, who have a vested interest in maintaining public perceptions of the usefulness of their profession, there are a very limited number of individuals who have the qualifications to testify as an expert in this area.
Generally, scientists are not engaged in research related to the accuracy or reliability of fingerprint evidence,147 and courts have raised concerns about academics who study the area but have not, themselves, tested fingerprint accuracy and
reliability. 148 Overall, "[t]he maldistribution of forensic scientists"-and those
allowed to testify about forensic science-"so favors the prosecution that the defense has little access to any [useful forensic science testimony], which prevents
the adversary process from working, as intended, to expose error." 149
Even when the defense does have access to an expert, courts often deny
defense counsel's request to present this counterevidence. In United States v.
Pitts,15 0 for example, the court refused to allow the defense expert to testify, concluding that his testimony would not be helpful to the jury.15 1 According to the
court, "The only opinion Defendant seeks to introduce is that fingerprint examiners 'exaggerate' their results to the exclusion of others. However, the government has indicated that its experts will not testify to absolutely certain identification nor that the identification was to the exclusion of all others." 15 2 Court
decisions like these are surprisingly common. 153 On occasion, however, courts
emphasize the importance of allowing the defendant to present his own fingerprint expert. In State v. Sheehan, for example, the Utah Court of Appeals criticized the district court's exclusion of testimony by the defense's expert

The Abuse ofScientific Evidence in CriminalCases:The Needfor Independent Crime Laboratories,4 VA. J. SOc.
POL'Y & L. 439, 470 (1997) ("Considering the professional relationship between crime labs and police departments, pro-prosecution bias in forensic science is not surprising. In fact, seventy-nine percent of the labs are
governed by the police, and most examine only evidence submitted by the prosecution team."); Paul C. Giannelli,
"Junk Science": The Criminal Cases, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 105, 118 (1993) ("Forensic laboratory
services .. . are not generally available to criminal defendants. A survey of approximately 300 crime laboratories
revealed that 'fifty-seven percent . . . would only examine evidence submitted by law enforcement officials."');
Jennifer L. Mnookin, FingerprintEvidence in an Age of DNA Profiling, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 13, 38-39 (2001)
(explaining that the rarity of challenges to fingerprint evidence has contributed to the persuasiveness and power
of this evidence).
147. See infra Part IV.
148. See, e.g., People v. Caradine, No. A121968, 2012 WL 599252, at *16 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2012)
("The court's conclusion that Cole, a historian and sociologist who had read and written on the subject of fingerprint analysis but had never himself studied fingerprints, did not qualify as an expert on the reliability of fingerprint analysis as it related to this case was not an abuse of discretion.").
149. Michael J. Saks, Merlin and Solomon: Lessons from the Law's Formative Encounters with Forensic
IdentificationScience, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1069, 1093 (1998).
150. No. 16-CR-550 (DLI), 2018 WL 1169139 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2018) (summary order).
151.

See id. at *3-4. The government argued that the expert-Dr. Simon Cole, who is a criminology pro-

fessor at the University of California Irvine and who specializes in fingerprint evidence- was "not a trained
fingerprint examiner," had "not published peer-reviewed scientific articles on the topic of latent fingerprint evidence," and had "not conducted any validation research in the field." Id. at * 1 (quoting the government's brief in
support of its motion to preclude the testimony).
152. Id. at *3 (citation omitted).
153. See, e.g., Caradine,2012 WL 599252, at *15-16 (affirming the district court's denial of the defendant's request to present the expert testimony of Dr. Simon Cole); State v. Armstrong, 920 So.2d 769, 770-71

(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (quashing the district court's order allowing the defendant's expert to testify about the
reliability of fingerprint identification).
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witness.154 The district court had refused to allow the expert to testify because
his testimony would undercut the accuracy and reliability of fingerprint evidence,
and the courts in the state had already determined that fingerprint evidence is
accurate and reliable. 155 The district court had then concluded that cross-examination of the government's fingerprint examiner was a sufficient tool to make
the defendant's argument against the accuracy and reliability of fingerprint evidence. 156 The Utah Court of Appeals reversed the district court's holding on this
issue, however, clarifying that the courts' determination that fingerprint evidence
is reliable "does not automatically exclude any contradictory expert testimony
from trial, as long as the competing expert qualifies" under the evidentiary
rules.1 5 7 The appellate court thus remanded the case to the district court for a
determination of whether the expert did indeed qualify. 158 In contrast to the Utah

Court of Appeals' decision, though, "the vast majority of cases reject appeals of
this nature and rely on [cross-examination] to protect defendants." 159
IV. A BLUEPRINT FOR INVESTIGATION

As the NAS report explains, there is little scientific basis for the current
practices of fingerprint matching. 160 That does not necessarily indicate that currently employed fingerprint methodologies are entirely inaccurate and unreliable,
but only that more work must be done in this area. In the wake of the NAS report,
though, some researchers have attempted to scientifically assess the accuracy and
reliability of fingerprint matching and also improve upon its methods. 161 They
primarily have conducted this research in terms of assessing examiners' error
rates and consistency. 162 Researchers have generally not, however, ventured
much into establishing a scientific basis for fingerprint matching. 163 Although
they have conducted very limited studies in this area, it is not enough, and progress has generally stagnated.
There are a number of reasons that progress on investigating, or even im-

proving, the accuracy and reliability of fingerprint evidence has stalled. First,
there has been no clear blueprint on what research must be done to undergird the
field of fingerprint matching. This Article lays out such a map of the essential
research scientists must work on. Relatedly, there has been little communication
between the legal community and scientists about the gaps in research that must

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
Dist. Ct.,
159.

See State v. Sheehan, 273 P.3d 417, 425-28 (Utah Ct. App. 2012).
See id. at 425-26.
See id. at 420-21.
Id. at 425, 430.
See id. at 428. The defendant has since pleaded guilty. See State v. Sheehan, Case No. 061908535 (3d
Salt Lake, Utah).
Cooper, supra note 98, at 759, 776.

160.

See STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 1, at 144-45.

161.
162.

See infra Sections IV.A-D.
See infra Section IV.A.

163.

Sharath Pankanti et al., On the Individuality of Fingerprints, 24 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON PATTERN

ANALYSIS & MACHINE INTELLIGENCE 1010, 1010-11 (2002).
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be filled to flesh out the practice of fingerprint matching. 164 While an increasing
number of lawyers are aware of the scientific insufficiency of fingerprint and
other forensic science evidence, scientists are generally unaware of this gap in
the scientific literature. 165 Like most members of the general public, many scientists assume that, if fingerprint evidence is routinely used in criminal cases and
other important areas like national security, it must be accurate and reliable. 166
This belief is further bolstered by the high-tech depiction of fingerprint and other
forensic science evidence in the media, such as on television shows like CSI:
Crime Scene Investigation.167 A handful of brief articles on the shortfalls of the

forensic sciences have been published in prominent scientific journals like Nature and Science, 168 but apparently this has not captured the attention of scien-

tists like it should. Perhaps because they are novices in the forensic science discipline and it thus may not seem obvious what research is necessary to shore up
the practice, scientists who have the requisite expertise to fill this void generally
seem unaware of it.169 Biomedical engineers specializing in tissue, for example-while a small community themselves-for the most part have not put their
expertise to use in this alternative arena. 170 Finally, the lack of scientific research
in this area can at least partially be chalked up to a lack of resources. Financial
resources-especially federal funds-often drive scientific research. 171

164.

See Interview with Tr6 Welch, Assistant Professor, Cardiovascular & Thoracic Surgery, UT South-

western Medical Ctr., in Dallas, Tex. (Feb. 21, 2020) (on file with author).
165. See Brandon L. Garrett & Gregory Mitchell, Forensicsand Fallibility: Comparingthe Views ofLawyers and Jurors, 119 W. VA. L. REV. 621, 632-33 (2016) (finding that polled lay persons "placed considerable
confidence in fingerprint evidence," whereas a considerable number of polled lawyers "characterized fingerprint
evidence as somewhat to very unreliable"); Interview with Tr6 Welch, supra note 164.
166. See Tamara F. Lawson, Can FingerprintsLie?: Re-Weighing FingerprintEvidence in CriminalJury
Trials, 31 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 2 (2003) ("If truth be told, 'everyone' believes that fingerprint evidence is reliable,
even infallible, evidence. In the average layman's understanding of criminal law, fingerprint identification evidence is equated with guilt, while the lack of fingerprint identification evidence infers a weakness in the prosecution's case."); Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The IndividualizationFallacy in ForensicScience Evidence, 61 VAND. L. REV. 199, 202 (2008) (suggesting that judges and juries generally assume that declared

fingerprint matches and other forensic science individualization determinations have significant probative value);
Interview with Tr6 Welch, supra note 164.
167.

See Saks & Koehler, supra note 166, at 202 ("Popular television programs such as CSI and Forensic

Files reinforce the notion of individualization in the collective public imagination by offering confident pronouncements from scientists about whose hair was recovered from the knife or which gun fired the murderous
bullet.").
168. See, e.g., Kelly Servick, Reversing the Legacy of Junk Science in the Courtroom, SC. MAG. (Mar. 7,
2016, 4:30 PM), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2016/03/reversing-legacy-junk-science-courtroom
(describ-

ing some frailties of the forensic science disciplines, as well as new research efforts underway to hopefully improve them); Laura Spinney, Science in Court: The Fine Print, 464 NATURE 344, 344-46 (Mar. 17, 2010) (describing deficiencies in the practice of fingerprint matching).
169.

See Interview with Tr6 Welch, supra note 164.

170.

See id.

171.

See Dr. Samuel L. Stanley, Jr., FederalFunding Drives U.S. Innovation, HUFFPOST (June 7, 2016),

https://www.huffpost.com/entry/federal-funding-drives-us_b_10336004 (explaining that federal funding drives
scientific innovation); W. Nicholson Price II, Grants, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 4 (2019) ("Through their scale

and ubiquity, grants significantly shape the progress of science and innovation. Grants help determine which
areas of science are studied and how, make or break the careers of academic and non-academic scientists alike,
and guide the creation of new institutes and discipline-spanning resources."). But see Jeffrey Mervis, Data Check:
U.S. Government Share of Basic Research Funding Falls Below 50%, SC. MAG. (Mar. 9, 2017,1:15 PM),
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Scientists and universities ordinarily rely heavily on outside funding to support
their work. 172 Relatively few resources have been devoted to research in the forensic sciences, however. 173 This explains why, aside from the disciplines that
grew out of universities-such as DNA and controlled substance analyses-very
little scientific research has been done in the forensic science disciplines. 174 Under the Obama Administration, some funding was earmarked for the forensic
sciences, but former Attorney General Jeff Sessions of the Trump Administration
pulled this funding in 2017.175 Further, Sessions disbanded the National Commission on Forensic Science, which was formed under the Obama Administration and was charged with improving the accuracy and reliability of forensic science. 176 Indeed, the Trump Administration has seemingly put a stop to

researching the accuracy and reliability of the forensic sciences, including the
practice of fingerprint matching. 177
There are several areas that should be thoroughly investigated for fingerprints to have solid support. First, building on social scientists' investigations

into how accurate and reliable fingerprint examiners' determinations of matches
actually are may be useful. More important, though, is conducting research necessary to establish a scientific foundation for fingerprint matching. Pursuant to
this goal, it is essential to assess the extent to which individuals' fingerprints are
actually unique. Further, there is a need to examine how fingerprints change
based upon the conditions under which they are made. And finally, there must
be a more concerted effort to improve computer-based fingerprint matching algorithms. Researchers must further investigate each of these areas before fingerprint examination could be said to have a sound scientific basis.

https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/03/data-check-us-government-share-basic-research-funding-falls-below-50 ("For the first time in the post-World War II era, the federal government no longer funds a majority of
the basic research carried out in the United States.").
172. See Art Jahnke, Who Picks Up the Tab for Science?, THE BRINK (Apr. 6, 2015), http://www.bu.edu/articles/2015/funding-for-scientific-research.
173.

See STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 1, at 142-45.

174.

See id. at 128, 133, 142-45.
Fundamental Measurement, Quantum Science and Measurement Dissemination, NAT'L INST. OF

175.

STANDARDS & TECH. (Dec. 1, 2018), https://www.nist.gov/director/congressional-and-legislative-affairs/fy2019-presidential-budget-request-summary-0-4

(noting a $6.7 million reduction in forensic science investments

in the FY 2019 budget request).
176. See Pema Levy, Jeff Sessions Wants Courts to Rely Less on Science andMore on "Science ", MOTHER
JONES (Apr. 24, 2017), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2017/04/sessions-forensic-science/.

177.

See id.; Liliana Segura & Jordan Smith, Bad Evidence, THE INTERCEPT (May 5, 2019, 7:00 AM),

https: /theintercept.com/2019/0505 /forensic-evidence-aafs-junk-science/.
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FingerprintExaminerAccuracy andReliability

Although there has been very little research about the science behind fingerprint matching, a handful of social scientists have attempted to assess the accuracy and reliability of fingerprint examiners' match determinations under particular conditions. 178 Generally, these studies suggest that examiners' decisions
are unreliable17 9 and, moreover, they might reach erroneous identification conclusions at a concerning rate, ranging up to and perhaps even exceeding about
4.2% of the time. 180

178. See Philip J. Kellman et al., ForensicComparison andMatching of Fingerprints:Using Quantitative
Image Measuresfor EstimatingErrorRates through Understandingand PredictingD ifficulty, PLOS ONE (2014),
at 18 ("Relatively few studies have examined expert performance in fingerprint matching tasks .... "); see also,
e.g., infra text accompanying notes 184-207 (summarizing some of these studies). The PCAST report explains

that many of these studies actually "were not intended as validation studies, although they provide some incidental information about performance." PCAST REP., supra note 73, at 91. It also notes that, "Remarkably, there
have been only two black-box studies that were intentionally and appropriately designed to assess validity and
reliability-the first published by the FBI Laboratory in 2011; the second completed in 2014 but not yet published.
Conclusions about foundational validity thus must rest on these two recent studies."Id.
179.
8

0

%

See, e.g., Dror et al., supra note 72, at 76 (finding that, when presented with contextual information,

of examiners reached different match conclusions on the same prints that they had previous examined).

180.

See infra text accompanying notes 184-208 (summarizing the error rates in these studies). The PCAST

report, which examines a slightly different list of studies than those discussed in this Article, provides the following table of examiner false positive rates:
Study

False Positives

Raw
Data

Estimated Rate

req.

Bound on Rate

Confidence bound)

Early studies
Langenburg (2009a)

014

"(19

in

1 in 5

1/43

2.3%(11%)

1 in 43

1 in 9

Langenburg et al. (2012)

17/711

2.4% (3.5%)

1 in 42

1 in 28

Tangen et al. (2011)
("similar pairs")

3/444

0.68% (1.7%)

1 in 148

1 in 58

Tangen et at. (2011)
("dissimilar pairs")

01444

0%o(0.670o)

1 in d

1 in 148

1 in 604

1 in 306

4.2%(5.4%)

1 in 24

1 in

0.7% (1.4%)

1 in 137

1 in 73

Langenburg (2009b)

Black-box studies

lery etal. 2011

(FBI)**

Pacheco et al. 2014
(Miami-Dade)
Pacheco et al. 2014 (MiamiDade) (excluding clerical

6/3628

42/995
7/960

0.17%

(0.33%)

18

errors)
* "Raw Data": Number of false positives divided by number of conclusive examinations involving non-mated pairs.
"Freq. (Confidence Bound)": Point estimate of false positive frequency, and upper 95 percent confidence bound. "Estimated Rate": The odds of a false positive occurring, based on the observed proportion of false positives. "Bound on
Rate": The odds of a false positive occurring, based on the upper 95 percent confidence bound-that is, the rate could
reasonably be as high as this value.
** If inconclusive examinations are included for the FBI study, the rates are 1 in 681 and 1 in 344, respectively.

PCAST REP., supra note 73, at 98.
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As Dror et al. have stated, "Being a scientist or forensic expert is rooted in
the ability to examine evidence reliably and objectively." 181 Today's approach
to fingerprint matching is subjective, rather than objective, however. 182 NAS has
explained:
[T]he ACE-V method does not specify particular measurements or a standard test protocol, and examiners must make subjective assessments
throughout. In the United States, the threshold for making a source identification is deliberately kept subjective, so that the examiner can take into
account both the quantity and quality of comparable details. As a result, the
outcome of a friction ridge analysis is not necessarily repeatable from examiner to examiner. 183

Further, studies show that fingerprint examiners regularly reach different
match determinations than they previously made when comparing the exact same
prints.

184

For example, in a 2005 study, Dror et al. found that 80% of the exam-

iners they tested reached different match conclusions when presented with biased
contextual information. 185 In a subsequent study, Dror and Charlton found that
examiners who were not even presented with contextual information-a condition less reflective of real practices-reached match determinations different
from their previous ones approximately 8.3% of the time. 186 When presented
with biased contextual information, the fingerprint examiners made inconsistent
decisions 16.6% of the time. 187
Not only are fingerprint examiners' match decisions unreliable, but their
error rates, and in particular their false positive rates, are at concerning levels. 188
A false positive rate of 4.2% for examiners means that about four in one hundred
individuals convicted primarily on fingerprint evidence could actually be innocent. That is a high risk of wrongful conviction. According to the studies, examiners' false negative error rate is even higher, ranging up to about 8.7%.189 In the

context of defendant rights in the criminal law, this higher error rate is less concerning, as it relates to failure to perceive an identification rather than a false
identification that could lead to wrongful conviction. 190 But it also means that
some perpetrators might be going free, which could affect overall crime rates. It
is important to note that these false positive and negative rates probably

181.

Dror et al., supra note 72, at 74.

182.

See STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 1, at 139.

183.

Id.

184.

See Dror et al., supra note 72, at 76.

185. Id. It is worth noting that the study tested just five examiners. See id. at 72.
186. See Itiel E. Dror & David Charlton, Why ExpertsMake Errors, 56 FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 600,611
(2006). Note that the study tested just six examiners. See id. at 606.
187. See id. at 606, 610.
188. See PCAST REP., supra note 73, at 98.
189.

See infra text accompanying notes 193-209 (summarizing the error rates in these studies).

190.

This is consistent with the maxim that it is "better thatten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent

suffer." 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *352.

No. 3]

ESCAPING THE FINGERPRINT CRISIS

787

overestimate the accuracy of fingerprint examiners, though, as there are significant limitations to the studies that likely underestimate the risk of errors. 191
Understanding the significance of these error rates requires digging into the
study designs. 192 For example, a 2006 study by Wertheim et al. asked ninety-two
examiners with at least a year of experience to compare latent prints and exemplars of varying levels of difficulty using the ACE method. 193 Of the comparisons, the examiners found 6,441 positive identifications, and eighty-one of those
were erroneous. 194 The researchers discarded sixty-six of those erroneous results
as clerical errors, yielding a false positive rate of 0.23% and a clerical error rate
of 1.02%.195 The researchers also concluded that "the data of greatest interest are
the [5,861] individualizations made at [the highest] confidence rating," 196 leading them to calculate a more specific false positive rate of 0.034%. This new rate
stemmed from categorizing two of the sixty-one erroneous individualizations in
this highest confidence group as true errors and discarding the rest as clerical
errors. 197 In a follow-up study, the researchers found that sixteen subject examiners attempting to verify the two false positives of the original study using the
ACE-V method did not make the same erroneous conclusions, dropping the false
positive rate to 0%.198 A 2009 study by Langenburg et al. found a false positive
rate of 2.3% and a false negative rate of 7.1% when fifteen subjects each made
six comparisons. 199 In a different study in 2009, Langenburg relied on six fingerprint examiners each making sixty ACE comparisons and sixty ACE-V

191. See Anil K. Jain et al., FingerprintMatching, BIOMETRICS, Feb. 2010, at 42 ("Although many researchers have attempted to estimate the inherent individuality of fingerprints, the actual problem of estimating
the error rate of latent fingerprint identification, which involves human factors in many stages-latent development, encoding, matching-is not yet solved."); infra text accompanying notes 215-45 (discussing the limita-

tions of the studies).
192. Due to space limitations, the following examination of study designs is incredibly limited. If this topic
interests you, I strongly urge you to read the papers reporting the researchers' results, which are cited within the
following brief examination. Please do not be apprehensive just because they are, for the most part, social science
papers.

193. See Kasey Wertheim et al., A Report ofLatent PrintExaminerAccuracy During Comparison Training
Exercises, 56 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 55, 55-56, 61-62, 65 (2006). Each of the ninety-two examiners had
at least a year of experience. See id. at 55, 65.

194. See id. at 65. It is worth noting that all of the source prints were included in the exemplars provided to
the subjects in this study. See id. at 56-57.
195. See id. at 65.
196. The researchers defined this category as: "Highest level of confidence. The participant recorded this
level of confidence if the participant would report this individualization in casework."Id. at 66.
197. Id. at 67.
198. See id. at 83-85.
199. See Glenn Langenburg et al., Testing for Potential Contextual Bias Effects During the Verification
Stage of the ACE-VMethodology When ConductingFingerprintComparisons, 54 J. FORENSIC SCi. 571, 572-75
(2009). For the purpose of calculating error rates, I focused on only the control group. For the false positive rate,

I assessed the number of incorrect individualization conclusions (1) out of the total number of conclusive match
determinations where the ground truth was that the prints were derived from different sources (43). For the purpose of calculating the false negative rate, I assessed the number of incorrect exclusion conclusions (3) out of the
total number of conclusive match determinations where the ground truth was that the prints were derived from
the same source (42). The researchers in this study also tested the effects of biasing information on experts'-as
well as novices'-match determinations. See id.
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comparisons to assess the accuracy and reliability of these methods. 200 Under the
ACE method, Langenburg found a 0% false positive rate (excluding one false
positive attributed to transcription error) and a 25% false negative rate. 201 Under
the ACE-V method, the false positive rate remained 0% and the false negative
rate increased to 33.3%.202 As Langenburg noted, "when the initial examiner was

aware that someone was going to double-check his work during verification, the
number of false negatives doubled." 203 In other words, examiners who knew
they were being watched became more conservative in reaching conclusions of
identification. In a relatively large 2011 study, Ulery et al. had 169 examiners
each compare around 100 prints and found a 0.1% false positive error rate and a
7.5% false negative error rate. 204 Ulery et al. suggested that independent verifi-

cation under the ACE-V method would further lower these error rates. 20 5 A 2014
study by Pacheco et al. had 109 examiners look at eighty latent prints and found
a false positive rate of 4.2% and a false negative rate of 8.7% for ACE examinations. 206 When a verification step was added to the method (ACE-V), the false
positive rate fell to

0% and the false negative rate fell to 3%. 2 0 7

Overall, these studies demonstrate that examiners sometimes exhibit concerning false positive rates and even worse false negative rates in some studies.
The PCAST report explains that the studies by Ulery et al. and Pacheco et al. are
the most useful, as they are "black box" studies, meaning that "many examiners
render decisions about many independent tests (typically involving 'questioned'
samples and one or more 'known' samples) and the error rates are determined." 208 It is important to note that these two studies produced some of the
200.

See Glenn Langenburg, A Performance Study of the ACE-V Process: A Pilot Study to Measure the

Accuracy, Precision, Reproducibility, Repeatability, and Biasability of Conclusions Resulting from the ACE- V
Process, 59 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 219, 224-25, 240 (2009).
201.
just

4

See id. at 230-34. It is worth noting that the sample Langenburg used contained somewhere around

2

- 0% of prints where the source was not present in the array of prints presented to the examiners, making

the possibility of a false negative match determination less likely. See id. at 224-25, 230-34.
202. See id. at 240-41.
203.

Id. at 242. Langenburg continued: "Yet, the verifiers caught every false positive, including close non-

matches that were attempted to be passed off as accurate identifications. This may be a critical finding and could
be quite revealing about the mental attitudes of examiners." Id. He further suggested, "When the initial analyst
was aware that someone was going to check his work . .. he subconsciously did not look as hard [for a match] ...
[and] the verifier subconsciously did not search as thoroughly as he 'normally' would." Id. Langenburg described
this as "a strong bias loop." Id. He also noted that "this bias was not present for the false positives," as "[t]he
verifiers actually appeared to be more scrutinizing towards identifications as verifiers than they would have been
as the initial analysts." Id.
204. See Bradford T. Ulery et al., Accuracy and Reliability ofForensicLatent FingerprintDecisions, 108
PNAS 7733, 7735-36 (2011). The rate for false negatives was considerably higher-7.5%. See id. at 7736.
205. See id. at 7735 (stating that the data "suggests that [the] erroneous individualizations would have been
detected if blind verification were routinely performed").
206. See Igor Pacheco et al., Miami-Dade Research Study for the Reliability of the ACE-V Process:Accuracy

&

Precision

in

Latent

Fingerprint

Examinations

(Dec.

2014),

at

2,

7,

53,

https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/248534.pdf The study involved "using 80 latent prints with varying
quantity and quality of information from ten known sources and were distributed to 109 latent print examiners
across the United States. Id. at 2. The false positive and negative figures exclude inconclusive determinations
(although the study authors also calculate error rates including inconclusives). Id. at 53-55.
207. See id. at 7, 55.
208. PCAST REP., supra note 73, at 5-6.
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highest false positive rates-0.1% and 4.2%, respectively-and the actual false
positive rates could be higher as a result of the biases present in real casework
that were not mimicked in the studies. 209

Aside from this research, proficiency tests from participating laboratories
could perhaps shed some light on examiner error rates. Collaborative Testing
Services ("CTS") regularly invites forensic laboratories to participate in such
tests, providing a trove of relevant data. 210 In a test from 2007:

[P]articipants received photographs of eleven latent prints from an alleged
crime scene, four sets of known finger and palm imprints, and a short scenario that described a bank robbery. Nine of the eleven latents matched
some of the known prints, two did not. Examiners were not told whether
any of the knowns produced any of the latents. 21 1
The 351 responses indicated a false positive rate of 2.3%.212 The usefulness of
such data is somewhat limited, however, because "[t]est participation is voluntary, examinees know that they are participating in a test, and it is not clear
whether examinees work by themselves, in groups, or with assistance from supervisors."213 As Koehler has explained, although the results "demonstrate[] that
some examiners are likely to commit false positive errors on occasion," there are
a number of reasons why these CTS tests cannot be relied on for false positive
rates. 2 14 The same is true with respect to all of the studies.
An important limitation to these studies is that they generally do not sufficiently mirror real examiners doing real work.215 As one expert has explained,
"[t]hese studies took place in experimental conditions quite different from actual
casework," and "[e]rror rates from these studies likely do not fully reflect realworld performance." 2 16 For example, the examiners in these studies were aware
that their work was being tested.217 Under these conditions, examiners likely

209. See id. at 97 ("We . .. note it is conceivable that the false-positive rate in real casework could be higher
than that observed in the experimental studies, due to exposure to potentially biasing information in the course
of casework.").
210.

See Jonathan J. Koehler, FingerprintErrorRates andProficiency Tests: What They are and Why They

Matter, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1077, 1091 (2008).
211. Id.
212. See id. at 1091-92. Koehler explains that 'four [of the 351] examiners (1.1%) incorrectly matched one
of the latent prints to one of the knowns; three examiners matched a latent to an innocent suspect; a fourth examiner matched a latent to an innocent bank employee." Id. at 1092.
213. Id. at 1091.
214. Id. at 1092. Koehler explains:
First, there is the baserate problem.. .. Second, the CTS tests tend to be conducted under unreasonable test
conditions (e.g., non-blind conditions that use relatively easy materials). This means that the error rates on
existing proficiency tests are probably lower than those encountered in ordinary casework. One might think
of these error rates as the lower boundary for actual casework error rates. Id. at 1092-93. He also explains,
however, that one could design proficiency tests to be useful estimates of examiners' error rates.
See id. at 1093-98.
215. See PCAST REP., supranote 73, at 95 (noting that the studies vary in the "degree to which they represent the circumstances, procedures and pressures found in casework").
216.

Kellman et al., supra note 178, at 2.

217.

See, e.g., Langenburg, supra note 200, at 251 (stating that participant knowledge of observation is a

"common experimental design limitation" that "was present in th[e] study"); Ulery et al., supra note 204, at 7734
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would be more hesitant to reach match conclusions that would correspond with
possible wrongful convictions. 218 In other words, examiners would be more conservative in their conclusions, which would lower false positive rates. In fact,
Langenburg discussed the possibility of examiners "sandbagging"-finding significantly fewer matches but having a much improved accuracy rate by avoiding
difficult match determinations and declaring difficult-to-match print pairs inconclusive. 2 19 Despite this risk, Langenburg concluded that "it is difficult, if not impossible, in a case work environment to do [large] trials in a blind or doubleblind fashion." 220 Similarly, Ulery et al. suggested that such an approach would
be very difficult, approaching "infeasibility."

221

Another representativeness problem with these studies and the error rates
they have produced relates to print difficulty levels. 222 Examiners assess a wide
array of prints in their casework, and these prints can vary substantially in their
levels of difficulty for examination and potential matching. 223 Yet, the studies
testing examiner error rates often neglect to assess print difficulty or to have a
sufficiently robust measure of it. 224 But difficulty affects examiners' accuracy
rates. Kellman et al. found a negative correlation "between average accuracy and
difficulty (r(198) =-0.050,p<0.00l)"225 They identified several significant predictors of examiners' accuracy in making their conclusions, which, roughly, include the available information about ridges in the print, the proportion of the
latent print area compared to the area of the known print, the visibility of deltas
in the latent print, and the average and standard deviations of the contrast and

(suggesting that the examiners were aware they were being tested in the study and conceding that, "[i]deally, a
study would be conducted in which participants were not aware that they were being tested").
218.

Cf Koehler, supra note 210, at 1092 (explaining that examiner proficiency tests administered by Col-

laborative Testing Services "tend to be conducted under unreasonable test conditions (e.g., non-blind conditions
that use relatively easy materials)," meaning that the resulting "error rates . . . are probably lower than those
encountered in ordinary casework"). But see Kellman et al., supra note 178, at 13 (explaining that, in their study,

"the constraints [the researchers] imposed on examiners" may have led to observed error rates higher than "error
rates in forensic laboratory settings").
219. See Langenburg, supra note 200, at 236.
220. Id. at 251.
221. Ulery et al., supra note 204, at 7734.
222. Cf PCAST REP., supra note 73, at 95 (noting that the studies vary in their "selection and difficulty
level of latent-known pairs").
223. See Defining the Difficulty of Fingerprint Comparisons, NAT'L INST. JUST. (Mar. 21, 2018),
https:/nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/defining-difficulty-fingerprint-comparisons

("Fingerprint comparisons are of-

ten portrayed as straightforward in TV crime shows, but the forensic fingerprint community knows that latent
print comparisons can be a complex process with significant variations in the degree of difficulty involved in
specific comparisons.").
224.

See Langenburg, supra note 200, at 251 (noting that "a more robust measurement of difficulty is de-

sired").
225.

Kellman et al., supra note 178, at 7, 13 (noting that this correlation was weaker than the correlation

between difficulty and examiners' confidence ratings about their conclusions and that the "distribution of errors
[in the study] strongly indicates that error rates do vary depending on the visual content of the specific comparisons"). Kellman et al. also found "a strong negative correlation between average difficulty and [examiners']
confidence ratings (r(198) = -0.91, p<0.001)" and "a strong positive correlation between [examiners'] response

time . . . and difficulty (r(198) = -0.71,p<0.001)."Id.
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intensity levels in the prints. 226 The difficulty of prints that researchers have had
experts compare under study conditions may vary across studies. And perhaps
even more importantly, it remains unknown whether the difficulty levels of prints

that researchers have presented to examiners in these studies are at all representative of the prints that examiners are asked to assess in their daily work. 227 Accordingly, the error rates reached in these studies are of very limited value. Examiners are more likely to have higher accuracy rates and produce fewer false
positives if the prints they are assessing are low on the difficulty level.228
Aside from the concern about print difficulty levels, a complicating factor
in this research is that a variety of experience and skill levels were represented
among the subject examiners in the various studies. 229 This is another reason that
it is difficult to compare studies and also to see how the results of each study
stack up against fingerprint examiners' work in general or against the work of a
particular examiner used in any case. In addition to differences in experience and
skill level, examiners may differ in how much caution they use in reaching match
conclusions, their biases, and the contextual information to which they are exposed before making their match determinations. 230 All of these factors may affect examiners' error rates as well.231 Overall, not enough information is known
about the conditions under which examiners conduct their work, and accounting
for all of these conditions would be challenging anyway, as examiners do their
work under a wide variety of conditions and pursuant to a range of variations on
the ACE-V methodology. 232 For all of these reasons, the usefulness of these
studies' error rates remains quite limited.233
226.

Id. at 11 ("Six features in particular were found to be important predictors of accuracy: Ridge Sum,

Area Ratio, visibility of Deltas in the latent print, Mean Block Contrast of the known print, interaction between
SD Block Contrast for latents and known prints, and the interaction between DEAI (deviation from expected
average intensity) for the latents and known prints.").
227. Kellman et al. have stated that "it is . . . very limited (and can even be misleading) to talk about an
overall 'error rate' for the field as a whole." Id. at 13.
228. See id. at 7.
229.

See Ulery et al., supra note 204, at 7737 ("Currently, there is no generally accepted objective measure

to assess the skill of latent print examiners. Skill is multidimensional and is not limited to error rates"); Jain et
al., supra note 191, at 42 ("Match/nonmatch decisions are made subjectively by human experts whose error rates

are difficult to estimate and can vary significantly from person to person.").
230.

See Gary Edmond & Itiel E. Dror, Contextual Bias and Cross-Contaminationin the Forensic Sciences:

The CorrosiveImplicationsfor Investigations, Plea Bargains, Trials andAppeals, 14 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK
1, 2 (2014) ("[R]elatively few forensic scientists are actively shielded from information with the potential to
mislead .... [E]ven though incriminating expert evidence is routinely developed in conditions that are known to
produce errors, it is nevertheless portrayed as independent, objective and sometimes even 'error-free."'); cf Dror
et al., supra note 72, at 76 ("This study shows that fingerprint identification decisions of experts are vulnerable
to irrelevant and misleading contextual influences.").
231.

See Edmond & Dror, supra note 230, at 2.

232.

See Pacheco et al., supra note 206, at 13 (testing only a limited set of conditions).

233. Indeed, several studies reveal that examiners are often swayed by bias and certain contextual information revealed to them prior to their match decisions. See Itiel E. Dror & Simon A. Cole, The Vision in "Blind"
Justice:Expert Perception,Judgment, and Visual Cognition in ForensicPatternRecognition, 17 PSYCHONOMIC
BULL. & REV. 161, 163-66 (2010); see also, e.g., Itiel Dror & Robert Rosenthal, Meta-Analytically Quantifying
the ReliabilityandBiasability ofForensicExperts, 53 J. FORENSIC SCI. 900, 903 (2008) (demonstrating "circumstances in which [fingerprint] experts were both relatively unreliable and biasable"). But see Lisa J. Hall & Emma
Player, Will the Introduction of an Emotional Context Affect FingerprintAnalysis and Decision-Making?, 181

792

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2020

Another constraint is that studies of this kind differ in their designs, methods, and overall quality. 234 One inconsistency among the studies is sample
size 235 and the composition of that sample. Sample size is important, because the
reliability of the study ordinarily increases as the sample size increases. 236 Of the
mentioned studies, sample size ranges from 258 to 16,900-a tremendous span

for similar studies. 237 At the low end with a sample size of 258, the study by
Langenburg et al. asked forty-three examiners to each make six print comparisons. 238 At the high end with a sample size of about 16,900, Ulery et al. asked
169 examiners to each make approximately one hundred print comparisons. 239

Other sample sizes from the aforementioned studies include the Langenburg
study, which asked just six examiners to make sixty print comparisons, with a
resulting sample size of 360, 240 and the CTS proficiency studies, which collected
comparisons from 351 examiners, who each made just eleven print comparisons,
resulting in a sample size of 3,861.241 Digging into these studies shows that not
only does the sample size differ among studies, but the way the sample was composed-by the number of examiners and the number of prints they comparedvaries significantly. The Langenburg study looked at just six examiners' results,
but those examiners looked at a relatively large number of prints (sixty). 242 In
contrast, the CTS proficiency tests assessed the results of a large number of examiners-351 of them-but each examiner made only a small number of print
comparisons (eleven).243 Testing a limited number of examiners exacerbates the
representativeness problem with that group, but asking examiners to compare a
small number of prints exacerbates the print difficulty problem. Composing the
sample in a lopsided way and not teasing apart these distinct variables may mag-

nify these study difficulties.
Another variation among studies to consider is that some of the researchers
employ the ACE methodology while others add a verification step, which tends
to decrease the resulting number of false positives. 244 As we have seen, some
studies show an increased false negative rate when researchers add the

FORENSIC SCI. INT'L 36, 37-38 (2008) (finding that changing the emotional context of the examination by varying
the offense at issue did not affect fingerprint examiners' results, although the examiners' believed that the emotional context affected their analyses).
234. See PCAST REP., supra note 73, at 95 (explaining that the various "studies ... cannot be directly
compared for many reasons-including differences in experimental design, selection and difficulty level of latent-known pairs, and degree to which they represent the circumstances, procedures and pressures found in casework").
235. See id.
236. See ROBERT S. WITTE & JOHN S. WITTE, STATISTICS 211 (11th ed. 2017) ("Clearly, any increase in
sample size causes a reduction in the standard error of the mean.").
237.

Compare Langenburg et al., supra note 199, at 572-73 (asking forty-three examiners to each make 6

comparisons), with Ulery et al., supra note 204, at 7734 (asking 169 examiners to each make 100 comparisons).

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

See Langenburg et al., supra note 199, at 572-73.
See Ulery et al., supra note 204, at 7734.
See Langenburg, supra note 200, at 224-25.
See Koehler, supra note 210, at 1091.
See Langenburg, supra note 200, at 224-25.
See Koehler, supra note 210, at 1091.
See Langenburg, supra note 200, at 232.
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verification step, however. 245 Although a high rate of false negatives is probably
less concerning than a high rate of false positives, because only the latter directly
relates to wrongful convictions, a high false negative rate means that the testing
is less sensitive and could lead to perpetrators not being identified, apprehended,
and convicted.
To some observers, the studies assessing fingerprint examiners' accuracy

and reliability might initially suggest that fingerprint evidence is correct and its
methodology reliable. Indeed, one might not be appalled by a 4.2% false positive
rate and may not be convinced that the several limitations to the studies raise a
concern that the rate is actually higher. But even if the false positive rates were
within this range, there should still be cause for concern. A false identification
rate of 4.2% is actually staggering. Compare this to the probabilities we see with
DNA evidence, where about one in a billion persons is falsely identified according to the statistics. 246 Although a false positive rate of 4.2% may seem small,
consider the figure in another context. If 4.2%-756--of the 18,000 flights that
arrive and depart from the Atlanta-Hartsfield-Jackson airport every week crashed,
panic would spread across the country. 247 This would certainly lead to an immediate cessation in airport operations. 248 In the same way, we should be concerned
about wrongful identifications and possible wrongful convictions based on erroneous conclusions of fingerprint examiners, even if they reach false positives
only 4.2% of the time.
Even a small rate of error among fingerprint examiners is concerning, and

it would indeed be helpful to have a better sense of the magnitude of the error
rate, and particularly the false positive rate. As NAS has explained, some error
rate among examiners is unavoidable. 249 This is despite the fact that examiners
often assert no chance of error during their trial testimony on fingerprint
matches. 250

245.

See Langenburg et. al., supra note 199, at 581.

246. See Koehler, supra note 210, at 1079 & n.13 (explaining that, "[o]n the diagnosticity side, the chance
of a coincidental DNA match is often extremely small (e.g., one in many millions, billions, or trillions)," but
noting that, "[o]n the reliability side, the chance of a false match that arises from, say, a sample handling mistake
is much larger").
247.

See OperatingStatistics, DEPT. AVIATION HARTSFIELD-JACKSON ATLANTA INT'L AIRPORT (Nov. 2,

2018), https://www.atl.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/ATL-Traffic-Report-Nov-2018.pdf (indicating that
71,952 flights arrived or departed at the airport during November of 2018); cf Robert J. Smith, Recalibrating
Constitutional Innocence Protection, 87 WASH. L. REV. 139, 143-44 (2012) (stating that "[r]oughly 18,000
flights arrive or depart Atlanta's Hartsfield-Jackson Airport each week" and citing the airport's data from June
2011).
248. Cf Smith, supra note 247, at 143-44. Smith makes a very similar analogy in the broad context of
wrongful conviction:
Roughly 18,000 flights arrive or depart Atlanta's Hartsfield-Jackson airport each week. If five of those
27
planes crashed-roughly .0 % of flights-operations at the airport would cease immediately. So, too,
would 125 people wrongfully imprisoned annually (.027% of all state court felony convictions) represent a
disturbing number of wrongful convictions.
Id.
249. STRENGTHENINGFORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 1, at 142.
250.

See FORENSIC FINGERPRINTS xv (Max M. Houck ed., 2016) (explaining that, in response to evidence

of fingerprint identification errors, the fingerprint community has generally not entirely conceded that the practice
is not infallible); cf STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 1, at 142 ("Although there is limited
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Having a better sense of examiner error rates will require additional, more
robust, studies. One key component of future studies would be to assess examiners' work without their knowledge. This would require the broad cooperation
of police departments and forensic laboratories. But, as critics continue to attack
the accuracy and reliability of forensic evidence more generally, 251 it is unclear
how much cooperation might be forthcoming. It would also be useful for future
studies to take better account of variations in print difficulty and examiners' skill
and experience levels. Regularly assessing these variables and working to make
these variables better match the true functioning of examiners' work would be a
significant step in the direction of better understanding examiners' error rates.
Further, striving to design studies that better reflect the working conditions of
examiners should also involve asking study subjects to employ methodologies
that examiners actually use in their work. And, finally, it is important for future
studies to use large enough sample sizes that the work is representative and
reliable.
In addition to helping us better understand how often examiners reach false
positive and false negative conclusions, more thorough examinations of how accurate and reliable fingerprint examiners' match determinations are could also
inject probability estimates into the analyses and examiners' testimony. In the
DNA context, experts testify that, for example, there is only one chance in a
billion that the blood found at the crime scene could have come from someone
other than the defendant. 252 Because it is virtually impossible that a fingerprint
examiner can know with 100% certainty that a latent print is a match to an exemplar print,253 injecting probability determinations into these analyses makes
more sense. Indeed, some scholars have suggested such an approach.254 Despite
creeping progress, the fingerprint community still generally remains opposed to

including probabilities in their fingerprint matching conclusions.25 5
information about the accuracy and reliability of friction ridge analyses, claims that these analyses have zero
error rates are not scientifically plausible."). But see MAYFIELD REV., supra note 10, at 8 (asserting that FBI

"examiners no longer testify that they are '100% certain,' and that they now "[i]nstead .. . testify that they are
confident in the conclusion, would not expect to see the same amount of information repeated if the fingerprints
originated from different people, and find no physical evidence causing them to doubt that the fingerprints are
from the same source").
251.

See, e.g., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supranote 1, at 142 (stating that fingerprint examiners'

assertions are implausible); PCAST REP., supra note 73, at 101 (concluding that fingerprint analysis generally

has "a false positive rate that is substantial and is likely to be higher than expected by many jurors based on
longstanding claims about the infallibility of fingerprint analysis").
252. PCAST REP., supra note 73, at 76.
253.

See STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 1, at 142 ("Although there is limited information

about the accuracy and reliability of friction ridge analyses, claims that these analyses have zero error rates are
not scientifically plausible.").
254. See, e.g., Jonathan J. Koehler & Michael J. Saks, Individualization Claims in ForensicScience: Still
Unwarranted,75 BROOK. L. REV. 1187, 1202 (2010) ("[F]orensic scientists should do what other scientists do:
offer suitably cautious conclusions that make use of the tools of probability and statistics.").
255.

See DEP'T OF JUSTICE, APPROVED UNIFORM LANGUAGE FOR TESTIMONY AND REPORTS FOR THE

FORENSIC LATENT PRINT DISCIPLINE 1 (2018), https://www.justice.gov/file/1037171/download (stating that
"[t]he examiner may offer any of the following conclusions: 1. Source identification (i.e., came from the same
source)[;] 2. Inconclusive[;] 3. Source exclusion (i.e., came from different sources)"); STRENGTHENING FORENSIC
SCIENCE, supra note 1, at 142 (referencing examiners' tendency to testify that their match decisions are 100%
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Important to this effort for further research on the topic is funding. Finding
the monetary resources to conduct this type of work is sometimes difficult, 256
and the work can be time-consuming and often requires a large number of participants. The funding environment today can be especially challenging, as the
Trump Administration appears not to support this type of work. 257

Although conducting more robust examiner studies is a step in the right
direction in improving the fingerprint matching enterprise, this will not be as

useful as establishing a scientific basis for fingerprint matching by pursuing studies examining fingerprint uniqueness, the biomechanics of touch, and computerized matching algorithms. Unlike these other areas of investigation, examiner
accuracy and reliability studies do not get at the foundation of fingerprint matching. Examiners employing the ACE-V method are engaged in a subjective iden-

tification approach, which is not scientific in nature. 258 Various examiners apply
the method differently, and there is no consistency on matters such as how many
match points are necessary to declare an identification. 259 These differences,
along with matters such as variances in print difficulty, examiner experience, and
skill level, make it nearly impossible for examiner studies to provide a reliable
sense of accuracy associated with the method.260 Moreover, because examiners
accurate); Guidelinefor the Articulationof the Decision-MakingProcess Leadingto an Expert Opinion ofSource

Identification in Friction Ridge Examinations (draft),

ORG. OF SCI. AREA COMMS. FOR FORENSIC SC., 9-10,

https://www.nist.gov/system/files/documents/2017/10/17/guideline_for_thearticulation_ofthedecision-makingprocessleading _toanexpert _opinionof source identification in friction _ridge _examinations.pdf (stating that the examiner's level of confidence in a fingerprint identification determination "shall not be reported in
absolute terms and should not be reported numerically"). But see Forensic Tech. Ctr. for Excellence, IPTES 2018
Workshop: StatisticalInterpretation Software for Friction Ridge Skin Impressions (FRStat), NAT'L INST. OF
JUSTICE 2 (2018), https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/Publications/abstract.aspx?ID=273812 ("The Defense Forensic

Science Center (DFSC) developed FRStat in response to criticisms from legal and scientific commentators on
the lack of an empirically demonstrable basis to substantiate conclusions in pattern evidence. This tool is intended
to provide a statistical estimate of the strength of evidence to be used in conjunction with the examiner's own
conclusion.").
256.

See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR IDENTIFICATION, 180 DAY STUDY FINAL REPORT 5 n.2,

&

https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/213423.pdf
257. There is some funding, however. In 2015, the National Institute of Standards and Technology ("NIST")
established the Forensic Science Center of Excellence, based at Iowa State University, which is tasked with
improving the statistical basis for certain forensic science disciplines, including fingerprint evidence. See New
NIST Center of Excellence to Improve StatisticalAnalysis of ForensicEvidence, NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS
TECH. (May 26, 2015), http://www.nist.gov/forensics/center-excellence-forensic052615.cfm;

Statisticians Take

the Lead on Forensic Science Research, ROYAL STATISTICAL SOC'Y, Aug. 2015, at 2, https:/rss.onlineli-

brary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1740-9713.2015.00837.x. Up to $20 million has been earmarked to support
this investigative endeavor. See StatisticiansTake the Lead on Forensic Science Research, supra. The parameters

for the Center's work are not entirely clear, but further focus on the statistics related to fingerprint evidence will
be useful.
258.

See Jain et al., supra note 191, at 42 ("The only viable solution in the near term may be to keep im-

proving automated fingerprint systems' performance and ultimately replace human experts with automated systems."). But cf PCAST REP., supra note 73, at 9 (finding "latent fingerprint analysis [to be] a foundationally
valid subjective methodology-albeit with a false positive rate that is substantial and is likely to be higher than
expected by many jurors based on longstanding claims about the infallibility of fingerprint analysis").
259.

See STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 1, at 139 ("In the United States, the threshold for

making a source identification is deliberately kept subjective, so that the examiner can take into account both the
quantity and quality of comparable details. As a result, the outcome of a friction ridge analysis is not necessarily
repeatable from examiner to examiner.").
260. See id. at 142.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

796

[Vol. 2020

apply the method differently anyway, any true error rates say little about the accuracy of any particular examiner in a case. Only with the objectivity associated
with a scientific foundation could examiners apply the method consistently
across cases. Only with the objectivity associated with a scientific foundation for
fingerprint matching would error rates be indicative of the likelihood of a false
identification conclusion in any particular case.
B.

FingerprintUniqueness

Central to the enterprise of fingerprint matching is the assumption that each
individual possesses unique fingerprints that can be distinguished from other fingerprints such that a latent print can be matched to an exemplar print and thus
lead to the positive identification of an individual.261 If individuals shared fingerprint patterns, or at least if there were a significant enough probability that a
particular fingerprint pattern matched others' fingerprint patterns, then a fingerprint match would lack meaning or at least would be tremendously less useful; a
latent fingerprint found at a crime scene could potentially belong to several different individuals. As the number of individuals sharing a fingerprint pattern in-

creases, the usefulness of the fingerprint match decreases correspondingly.
Simple observation reveals that individuals' fingerprints do indeed vary.
Jain et al. have explained that this uniqueness stems from both genetic and embryotic environmental forces. 262 There are even studies establishing that identical twins have fingerprints that differ, 263 so this could suggest that completely
unrelated individuals certainly have different prints. In fact, fingerprint identifi-

cations could even be an improvement over DNA identifications in this regard,
as, in contrast to fingerprints, identical twins share DNA; one twin generally cannot easily be distinguished from the other based on DNA alone. 264

261.

See id. at 144 ("Uniqueness and persistence are necessary conditions for friction ridge identification to

be feasible .... ").
262.

See Jain et al., supra note 191, at 37 ("It is generally understood that friction ridge patterns are influ-

enced not just by genetic factors but also by random physical stresses and tensions during fetal development.
These random effects in the formation of fingerprints provide their uniqueness.").
263. See Xungquiang Tao et al., Fingerprint Recognition with Identical Twin Fingerprints, 7 PLOS ONE
1, 6-7 (2012) ("In this paper, we have investigated the ability of the fingerprint verification matcher to discriminate between identical twins. The experimental results demonstrated that the identical twins can be distinguished
by a state-of-the-art method .... "); see also Jonathan M. Raser & Erin K. O'Shea, Noise in Gene Expression:
Origins, Consequences, and Control, 309 SCIENCE 2010, 2010 (2005) ("The fingerprints of identical twins are

readily distinguished on close examination.").
264.

Recent advances in science, however, have suggested that, while twins share DNA, they may have

epigenetic differences-differences in gene expression affected by environmental factors. See Erika Hayasaki,
Identical Twins Hint at How Environments Change Gene Expression, ATLANTIC (May 15, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/05/twin-epigenetics/560189/;

Cathy Tran, Identical Twins

Not So Identical, SCI. MAG. (July 5, 2005, 12:00 AM), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2005/07/identicaltwins-not-so-identical; see also Jessica Hamzelou, Police Can Now Tell Identical Twins Apart-JustMelt Their
DNA, NEW SCIENTIST, (Apr. 24, 2015), https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn27411-police-can-now-tell-

identical-twins-apart-just-melt-their-dna/ (explaining that Dr. Graham Williams found that identical twins' DNA
have different melting points based on epigenetic differences-a finding that has laid the groundwork for "a
quick 'n' easy" test police may use to distinguish identical twins' DNA).
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Despite this common logic, no one has proved that each individual possesses unique fingerprints. The assumption that each person has unique prints is

just that: an assumption. 265 There has been insufficient research done on this
point, 266 and the Department of Justice has even conceded that there is no adequate scientific basis for the fingerprint uniqueness assumption. 267
Several researchers have attempted to investigate the uniqueness of fingerprints, 268 but their efforts have some marked limitations. They generally have
studied fingerprints by one of two approaches. First is the "empirical" approach,

pursuant to which researchers gather known fingerprints into a database and assess whether any fingerprints from different subjects match.269 The second approach is a "theoretical" one, pursuant to which researchers enter known (or "realistic") forces affecting fingerprints and use that data to model various print
permutations and calculate the probabilities of different individuals having the
same fingerprints.20
The empirical approach poses several difficulties, because it is dependent

on a sufficiently large database of prints, the accuracy of the matcher, and the
265.

See Soweon Yoon & Anil K. Jain, LongitudinalStudy ofFingerprintRecognition, 112 PROC. NAT'L

ACAD. SCI., 8555, 8555 (2015) ("Despite its successful deployment, the fundamental premise of fingerprint-based
identification-persistence and uniqueness of fingerprints-has not yet been well studied .... "); cf Pankanti et
al., supra note 163 ("The notion of fingerprint individuality has been widely accepted based on a manual inspection (by experts) of millions of fingerprints. However, the underlying scientific basis of fingerprint individuality
has not been rigorously studied or tested.").
266. As one researcher has put it, "the underlying scientific basis for fingerprint individuality has not been
rigorously studied or tested." Pankanti et al, supra note 163, at 1011.
267.

See NAT'L INST. JUST., FORENSIC FRICTION RIDGE (FINGERPRINT)

EXAMINATION

VALIDATION

STUDIES 3-4 (2000), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles 1/nij/s1000386.pdf (soliciting proposals for funding on fingerprint research and explaining: "Friction ridge print evidence has historically been 'understood' to hold individuality based on empirical studies of millions of prints. However, the theoretical basis for this individuality has
had limited study and needs additional work to demonstrate the statistical basis for identifications."); NAT'L.
INST.

JUST.,

FORENSIC

SCIENCES:

REVIEW

OF

STATUS

AND

NEEDS

29

(1999),

https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/173412.pdf (stating that "[f]riction ridge print evidence has historically been
'understood' to hold individuality based on empirical studies of millions of prints"; "the theoretical basis for this
individuality has had limited study and needs a great deal more work to demonstrate that physiological/developmental coding occurs for friction ridge detail, or that this detail is purely an accidental process of fetal development"; and "[s]tudies to date suggest more than an accidental basis for the development of print detail, but more
work is needed"). The NAS report states that there is "[s]ome scientific evidence support[ing] the presumption
that friction ridge patterns are unique to each person and persist unchanged throughout a lifetime,"
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 1, at 143-44, but the sources it cites for this evidence are questionable. For example, one of the more current sources the NAS cites-a 2005 article in Science-mentions

fingerprints only in passing, stating that the varying prints of identical twins is an "[e]xample[] of possible stochastic influences on phenotype." Raser & O'Shea, supra note 263, at 2010.
268.

See Jain et al., supra note 191, at 42 ("[M]any researchers have attempted to estimate the inherent

individuality of fingerprints .... "); see also, e.g., Yi Chen & Anil K. Jain, Beyond Minutiae: A Fingerprint

IndividualityModel with Pattern, Ridge andPore Features,5558 ADVANCES IN BIOMETRICS 523, 524 (Massimo
Tistarelli & Mark S. Nixon eds., 2009) ("evaluat[ing] fingerprint individuality by modeling the distribution of
minutiae, ridge and pore features"); C6dric Neumann et al., Computation of Likelihood Ratios in Fingerprint

Identificationfor ConfigurationsofAny Number ofMinutice, 52 J. FORENSIC SCI. 54,

54-64 (2006); Pankanti et
al., supra note 163, at 1010-25; Yongfang Zhu et al., Statistical Models for Assessing the Individuality of Fingerprints, 2 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFO. FORENSICS SECURITY. 391, 391-401 (2007) (developing statistical
models for fingerprint individuality).
269. Pankanti et al., supra note 163, at 1012.
270. Id.
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power of the matcher. 271 Many databases employed pursuant to the empirical
approach are too small to provide an accurate estimation of the probability that a
random fingerprint is actually unique. 272 Moreover, "even if a large database of
fingerprints ...

is used for an empirical evaluation of . .

fingerprint individual-

ity," it could be computationally demanding. 273 Perhaps even more troublesome,
even if the size and variability of the database were sufficient and the processor
power did not pose a challenge, the entire operation of assessing fingerprint
uniqueness is dependent on the accuracy of the matcher. 274 Again, there are significant questions of accuracy where human and computerized matching systems
are involved.275

The theoretical approach is also problematic. It requires inputting known
forces on the fingerprint, but many of these forces remain unknown. 276 Researchers have spent some time studying the formation of fingerprints.27 7 They
have found that print patterns depend on the "shape, size, and placement of volar
pads," and "[i]t is generally understood that friction ridge patterns are influenced
by .

..

genetic factors [and] . . . random physical stresses and tensions during

fetal development." 278 But, despite this research, many aspects of fingerprint formation remain a mystery. 279 As a result, researchers make a number of assumptions. For example, they assume that fingerprint minutiae are the stock features
to measure. 280 They often also assume that minutiae are independent, meaning
that the appearance of one minutia is independent of the appearance of another

271.

See id.

272.

See id.; infra text accompanying notes 361-68 (explaining that the databases against which computer-

ized matching algorithm designers can test their new approaches are insufficient).
273. Pankanti et al., supra note 163, at 1012 (suggesting that using the FBI database for this could take 127
years). But see DAVIDE MALTONI ET AL., HANDBOOK OF FINGERPRINT RECOGNITION 259 (2003) (reiterating

Pankanti et al.'s statement but calculating the number of required years for a match to be "(200 x 106 x 200 x 106
6
/(10 x 60 x 60 x 24 x 365) ~ 1270)!"). The FBI has recently completed such a comparison and concluded that
the database contains the prints "of more than 120 million persons with objectively determined distinct fingerprints." E-mail from James Loudermilk, supra note 58. The FBI database now contains more fingerprints to sort
through for matches, increasing computing time. See supra Part II. Processor speed is undoubtedly faster now,
however, perhaps counterweighting this increased computing time. According to Moore's Law, the number of

transistors on a silicon chip should double about every two years, although the industry seems to be flagging in
this regard in recent years. See Katherine Bourzac, Intel: Chips Will Have to Sacrifice Speed Gainsfor Energy
Savings: A Major TechnologicalShift is Needed in the Next Few Years IfComputer ChipsAre to Keep Improving,
MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 5, 2016), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/600716/intel-chips-will-have-to-sacrificespeed-gains-for-energy-savings/;

Tom Simonite, Moore's Law Is Dead. Now What?, MIT TECH. REV. (May 13,
2016), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/601441/moores-law-is-dead-now-what/.
274.

See Pankanti et al., supra note 163, at 1012; see also infra Section IV.D (discussing the shortcomings

of automated fingerprint identification systems).
275.

See Pankanti et al., supra note 163, at 1012. This is especially true when attempting to match latent to

exemplar prints. See id.; infra Section IV.D.

276. See Pankanti et al., supra note 163, at 1012.
277. See Jain et al, supra note 191, at 37.
278. Id. "Volar skin" is a term "derived from vola, an ancient Roman term for the palm of the hand and the
sole of the foot." Id.
279. See Pankanti et al., supra note 163, at 1012.
280.

See QIJUN ZHAO ET AL., A GENERATIVE MODEL FOR FINGERPRINT MINUTIAE, INT'L CONE. ON

BIOMETRICS 2 (2013); see, e.g., Pankanti et al., supra note 163, at 1016-17 (explaining their focus on minutiae).
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(or even the same) minutia in a fingerprint or some smaller region. 281 The many
assumptions researchers must rely on in these assessments shed considerable
doubt on the accuracy of their conclusions that fingerprints are certainly unique.
One difficulty with both the empirical and theoretical approaches-and a
problem with using fingerprints for identification overall-is that there is some
evidence that fingerprints change over time. Yoon and Jain found that, although
prints are generally stable for at least twelve years, stability decreases after that
point in time. 282 This means that, if an exemplar print predates the latent print by
a significant period of time, a match-even if the print is from the same individual-is less likely, undermining the identification process.
It is understandable that the researchers working on this problem have
failed to establish uniqueness, as uniqueness is exceptionally difficult to prove.
In the context of DNA analysis, one can estimate uniqueness based on underlying
information known about DNA.283 For example, in a commonly used method of
DNA analysis, examiners make use of each DNA strand's short tandem repeat
("STR") sequences and the limited number of variations these take on to estimate
the likelihood of finding them all in any particularindividual's DNA. 284 Because
so little is known about the development of fingerprints, there is a dearth of information on which to base frequency analyses like those seen in the DNA context. This makes proving the uniqueness of fingerprints exceptionally difficult.
Despite the difficulty of establishing uniqueness, further research is necessary in this area because the uniqueness assumption is essential to the fingerprint
matching enterprise. A couple of approaches to this problem come to mind.
First, one way to examine uniqueness is by building on the empirical ap-

proach by creating a large database of fingerprints and using advanced computerized algorithms to assess the variations among prints. 285 An extraordinarily
large database would likely be necessary to make such a study meaningful. The
FBI's Next Generation Identification system 286-with the prints of more than
120 million individuals-is a useful starting point. A database consisting of
281.

See, e.g., Pankanti et al., supra note 163, at 1016-17 (assuming that "[c]orrespondence of a minutiae

pair is an independent event and each correspondence is equally important").
282.

See Yoon & Jain, supra note 265, at 8555 (examining the fingerprints of 15,597 subjects for more than

five years and concluding that fingerprints are generally stable for at least twelve years, at which point stability
decreases).

But see HAROLD

CUMMINS & CHARLES MIDLO, FINGER PRINTS, PALMS AND SOLES: AN

INTRODUCTION TO DERMATOGLYPHICS

147 (1961); FRANCIS GALTON, FINGER PRINTS (1892); WILLIAM

HERSCHEL, THE ORIGIN OF FINGER-PRINTING 31 (1916) (suggesting that fingerprint patterns are persistent).

283.

See JOHN M. BUTLER, FORENSIC DNA TYPING 2 (Mark Listewnik et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005).

284.

See id.; Short Tandem Repeats (STRs), DNA DIAGNOSTICS CENTER, http://www.forensicdnacen-

ter.com/dna-str.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2020). It is worth noting, though, that the often-small random match
probabilities presented in cases do not establish that each individual (other than identical twins) possesses unique
DNA. As a 1992 National Research Council report states, "[r]egardless of the calculated frequency, an expert

should-given . .. the relatively small number of loci used and the available population data-avoid assertions
in court that a particular genotype is unique in the population." NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY
IN FORENSIC SCIENCE 92 (1992); cf id. at 74-75 (noting that "substantial controversy has arisen concerning the

methods for estimating the population frequencies of specific DNA typing patterns").
285.

See infra Section IV.D (explaining the need to develop improved computerized matching algorithms).

286. See supra note 14 (noting that NGI's AFIT-Advanced Fingerprint Identification Technology-replaced IAFIS in 2011).
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prints acquired under more controlled conditions-and with assurances that individuals are not entered multiple times in the database under different identities-would further enhance this approach. Once a large enough database is created, researchers could apply an advanced computerized algorithm capable of
examining and measuring the differences among prints. The accuracy and reliability of this matching is essential to the empirical approach. As described in
Section IV.D, though, researchers still need to make significant headway in developing computerized algorithms up to this task.287 In this sense, establishing
the uniqueness of fingerprints is likely largely dependent on furthering research
in this other area. Not only would this require the investment of significant resources in computerized matching algorithms and in compiling a sufficient database, but, because processing speed remains an issue, significant resources might
need to be invested in this regard as well to make the empirical approach a successful one.
The second approach to the uniqueness conundrum is to learn more about
how fingerprints form and to thus build on the theoretical approach. This area of
research would likely require years of focused study by geneticists or embryologists. As of now, it appears that there is insufficient research being conducted in
this area, so it is wide open for new investigators. Someone could really make
her name in this field, but it would be hard going because there is very little
research upon which to build an expertise.
C.

The Biomechanics of Touch

An important aspect of fingerprint matching that has proven challenging is
the changeability of prints based on the conditions under which they are made. 288
Even if two fingerprints are from a single source-one individual's right index

finger, for example-the fingerprints may look quite different. 289 Perhaps the
first fingerprint was an exemplar print made at a police station. The officer rolling the print made sure that the entire print was transferred onto the flat fingerprint card or livescan machine, and it was rolled under thirteen Newtons (or about
three pounds) of force. Under these somewhat controlled conditions, the fingerprint image is probably quite clear. Now, suppose that the second fingerprint is

a latent print made at a crime scene. The individual made the print when he
picked up a cylindrical glass, using nine Newtons (or about two pounds) of force.
This second print may be smudged or only a partial print because it was not made
under controlled conditions. Moreover, this second print, because it was made
on a differently shaped object, on another type of material, and under a lesser
force, will look different than the exemplar print. 290 These many varying
infra Section IV.D.

287.

See

288.

See STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 1, at 137 (noting the importance of factors such

as the "[c]ondition of the skin," "[t]ype of residue," "[m]echanics of touch," and "[n]ature of the surface touched"
in creating fingerprints").

289. See id. (describing how many factors can "affect the quality and quantity of detail in the latent print
and also introduce variability in the resulting impression").
290. See id.
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conditions under which the print was made affect the fingerprint layout more
generally, posing a challenge for fingerprint matching that is significantly less
pronounced in other areas of pattern evidence, like with shoe or tire tread print
matching. 29 1 These challenges are quite unique to the fingerprint matching arena.
Unlike with accuracy and reliability rates of fingerprint examiners,292 or
even the uniqueness question, 293 researchers have done very little investigation
into how these various conditions affect fingerprints and how examiners can
account for these conditions in their match determinations. These questions of
biomechanics are perhaps the areas in which further investigational research is
most needed, and it could be quite difficult to pursue. Scientists and fingerprint
experts currently know very little about how fingerprints deform under various

forces, how they change when touching differently shaped surfaces, and how
they fluctuate based on the subject's varying characteristics like weight and
age. 294 A whole host of studies ought to be pursued to further examine these
related questions.
One relevant area in which there is some preliminary research is on the
issue of how human tissue moves under varying conditions. Some existing fingerprint studies have premised their conclusions on the assumption that skin is
elastic in nature-meaning that, when the skin is stretched, such as when a subject presses down on an object, the skin spreads out uniformly. 295 Research suggests, however, that skin is actually viscoelastic under these circumstances-it
stretches nonuniformly-which undercuts older studies analyzing fingerprints. 296 This also makes examining fingerprints more difficult, as the traditional focus on prints' minutiae is complicated when skin does not stretch uniformly under pressure. 297 It further adds to the already existing matching hurdles
related to the biomechanical properties that vary with sex, age, ultraviolet light
exposure, and other characteristics.

298

291. Compare id. (identifying the importance of conditions under which fingerprints are made), with id. at
145-50 (failing to mention the relevance of these conditions).
292. See supra Section IV.A.
293. See supra Section IV.B.
294.

See STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 1, at 145.

295.

See, e.g., Sunpreet S. Arora et al., 3D Targetsfor EvaluatingFingerprintReaders, MICH. STATE UNIV.

TECHNICAL REP. 2(2015) ("We fabricate 3D targets with material similar in hardness and elasticity to the human

finger skin specifically such that they can be worn on a finger and placed on the fingerprint reader platen in a
natural manner .... ").
296.
See Meghan J. Ryan & Tr6 Welch, Developing Simulated FingerprintDeformation Through ForceBased and Non-Contact FingerprintTechnology 3-4 (S. Methodist U. Dedman Sch. of Law, Working Paper,

2019) (on file with authors). Ryan and Welch suggest that the skin's viscoelastic quality exists because the skin
is comprised of three layers-the epidermis, dermis, and hypodermis-having different biomechanical properties
that act viscoelastically under loading, like rubber. See id.
297. See id. at 14.
298.
See STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 1, at 137-38 (emphasizing the importance of the
&

"mechanics of touch" in fingerprint creation); Ryan & Welch, supra note 296, at 14; see also Ajay Kumar

Cyril Kwong, Towards Contactless, Low-Cost andAccurate 3D FingerprintJdentification,2013 IEEE CONE. ON
COMPUTER VISION & PATTERN RECOGNITION 3438, 3438 (2013) ("Such frequent degradation in fingerprint im-

age quality is often attributed to skin deformations, moisture, reside [sic] of finger dirt, finger sweat, finger slips,
and smear or due to sensor noise.").
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Some progress could be made in the field of fingerprint matching by investigating a three-dimensional approach to the subject rather than following the
typical two-dimensional path. Or, as the National Institute of Standards and
Technology ("NIST") has phrased it, by pursuing "contactless fingerprint" tech-

nology.299 This three-dimensional, or "contactless," approach to fingerprint
matching would use multiple cameras, or even LED illuminators, to capture a
variety of images or views from varying perspectives. 30 0 These images or views

would then often be "stacked" to create a three-dimensional representation of the
print. 301 The goal would be to capture the print without the deformation resulting
302
from outside forces, circumventing this major hurdle for fingerprint matching.

One research group has made some headway in this area by using five cameras
to attempt to create such a three-dimensional image. 303 Perhaps the best way to
pursue this research, however, is by employing metrology tools-such as optical
profilometers-like those more frequently used in industry, often to reverse-engineer parts. 304 The profilometers used in industry generally also have more sensitive sensors than the sensors often used by law enforcement today. 305
A contactless fingerprinting approach offers the advantage that law enforcement may take a subject's entire print without any deformation of the print
by the finger being placed on glass or a fingerprint card.306 This could certainly
improve matching when the prints at issue are both captured using this contactless methodology. 307 Of course, latent prints, which are not created under controlled conditions, will still be deformed and not constitute exact matches of the
exemplar prints, including the three-dimensional version of the print. 308 In this
sense, even if this method were perfected, contactless fingerprint technology
299.

Contactless Fingerprint Capture, NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., https://www.nist.gov/pro-

grams-projects/contactless-fingerprint-capture (last visited Apr. 7, 2020).

300. See Geppy Parziale et al., The SurroundImager": A Multi-Camera Touchless Device to Acquire 3D
Rolled-EquivalentFingerprints,in ADVANCES IN BIOMETRICS 244, 244 (David Zhang & Anil K. Jain eds., 2006)
(describing a "multi-camera system acquir[ing] different finger views that are combine[d] to generate a 3D representation of the fingerprint"); Giuseppe Parziale & Yi Chen, Advanced Technologiesfor Touchless Fingerprint
Recognition, in HANDBOOK OF REMOTE BIOMETRICS FOR SURVEILLANCE & SECURITY 83, 83-85 (Massimo Tista-

relli et al. eds., 2009); Yi Chen et al., 3D Touchless Fingerprints: Compatibility with Legacy Rolled Images,
BIOMETRICS SYMP. (2006); Kumar & Kwong, supranote 298, at 3438-39 (using a "single camera" and "7 symmetrically distributed LED illuminators" to create a three-dimensional image of a finger).
301.
See Parziale et al., supra note 300, at 244; Parziale & Chen, supra note 300, at 83-85; Chen et al.,
supra note 300; Kumar & Kwong, supra note 298, at 3438-39.
302.

See Parziale & Chen, supra note 300, at 83; Chen et al., supra note 300; Kumar & Kwong, supra note

298, at 3438; Ryan & Welch, supra note 296.
303.

See Geppy Parziale et al., supra note 300, at 244-45; see also Kumar & Kwong, supra note 298, at

3438 (achieving contactless fingerprint technology through the use of one camera and Lambertian reflectance).
304. See Ryan & Welch, supra note 296, at 2.
305. See id.
306.

See Chen et al., supra note 300, at 1; Kumar & Kwong, supra note 298, at 3438; Ryan & Welch, supra

&

note 296, at 2-3.
307. Researchers have noted that contactless fingerprint technology can offer benefits in addition to improving accuracy to the extent it can do that when prints are made under controlled conditions. Although perhaps
minor in comparison to accuracy, these additional benefits include convenience and hygiene. See Kumar
Kwong, supra note 298, at 3438 ("In order to avail the benefits of higher user convenience, hygiene, and im-

proved accuracy, contactless 3D fingerprint recognition techniques have recently been introduced.").
308. See STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 1, at 137-38.
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could not alone solve the matching problem that examiners face on a daily basis.
Further accuracy and reliability could be achieved if contactless fingerprint research were to address the biomechanical properties of the finger, but thus far
researchers have not sufficiently probed this intersection of disciplines. Additional limitations of contactless fingerprinting technology are its bulk and
expense.309

A real possibility for advancing latent fingerprint matching is by examining
how biomechanical properties affect depressed fingers under discrete condition
sets and then applying finite element analysis-an "in silico" approach-to extrapolate and create a full set of possible permutations of any original fingerprint
acquired. 3 10 This would allow a latent print to be matched against all possible
states of exemplar fingerprints, minimizing-or perhaps even eliminating-the

guesswork that results from fingerprint examiners trying to account for deformations in prints resulting from the various biomechanical conditions under
which the print was made. 311 Using contactless fingerprint technology to capture
the prints would be ideal under this approach to minimize unintended and unrecorded deformations in the prints. 3 12 Research in this area is still in its infancy,
though, and related research would likely yield significant dividends.
Much of this research on the biomechanics of fingerprints may be expensive and could take years to adequately develop in ways that would allow law
enforcement agencies to implement it. 3 13 Of course, tight budgets constrain the
types of technology that may be used in police stations and in the field, but, provided initial funding, fingerprint research could make use of more thorough, precise, and expensive techniques, and the information gained by the research could
then be applied in cost-effective ways to be used in the field. For example, the
previously mentioned research relying on optical profilometry and finite element
analysis could require extensive bulky laboratory equipment and numerous test
subjects to complete, 3 14 but the ultimate information gained by pursuing this research could be reduced to software that police officers could use on local fingerprint scanners. 315 In this sense, the research could be miniaturized for effective use in the field.

D.

ComputerizedMatchingAlgorithms

In addition to researchers' examination of the consistency, reliability, and
accuracy of fingerprint examiners' match determinations-and researchers' limited forays into investigating fingerprint uniqueness and biomechanics-scholars
309.

See Kumar & Kwong, supra note 298, at 3438 ("One of the main obstacles of emerging 3D fingerprint

technologies to replace the conventional 2D fingerprint system is their bulk and high cost, which mainly results
from the nature of imaging technologies employed for the 3D fingerprint reconstruction." (emphasis added)).
310.

For further information on this approach, see Ryan & Welch, supra note 296, at 3.

311.
312.
313.

See id. at 14.
See id. at 2-3.
See Kumar & Kwong, supra note 298, at 3438.

314.

See Ryan & Welch, supra note 296, at 2. As Kumar and Kwong noted, "[T]here is no 3D fingerprint

database available in the public domain." Kumar & Kwong, supra note 298, at 3442.

315.

See Ryan & Welch, supra note 296, at 4-7.
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in the biometrics and electrical engineering communities have worked on improving computerized algorithms involved in fingerprint identification.

316

Developing an effective computerized algorithm for latent print identification has proven difficult. First, exemplar prints must be enrolled in the system,
and then the algorithm must work toward identifying the latent print by matching

it to the exemplar print.3 17 This matching process involves the algorithm sensing
the details of the prints, extracting the prints' features, and, finally, matching the
latent to the exemplar print. 318
Most computerized algorithms match prints through the use of the prints'
minutiae319-an approach unique to the fingerprint context. Algorithm designers adopt this course for several reasons. First, relying on fingerprint minutiae
is the approach that examiners have employed for more than a century, and
they are generally thought to have done so successfully. 320 Second, reliance on
minutiae is admissible in court. 32 1 Third, this minutiae-based approach is storage efficient. 322

There are a number of unique challenges of algorithm-based matching in
the latent print context. The performance of a computerized matching system
depends on a number of factors. First, algorithms based on minutiae extraction
depend significantly on the quality of the inputted image. 323 This print quality is

316.

Identification Using DeformableMi-

See, e.g., Miguel Angel Medina-P6rez et al., Latent Fingerprint

nutiae Clustering, 175 NEUROCOMPUTING 851, 852 (2016) ("In this paper, we propose a novel clustering algo-

rithm to improve the performance of popular minutiae descriptor matching algorithms for latent fingerprint identification.").
317. See Jain et al., supra note 191, at 38-40.
318. See generally Ziad Abu-Faraj et al., FingerprintIdentification Software for ForensicApplications, 7
IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ELECTRONICS, CIRCUITS, & SYSTEMS 299, 299-302 (2000) (describing

the use of algorithms in fingerprint identification); Jain et al., supra note 191, at 38-40.
319. See Abu-Faraj et al., supra note 318, at 299; Jain et al., supra note 191, at 39-40 ("Minutiae-based
representation is commonly used [for fingerprint matching algorithms] .... "). Some algorithms instead adopt an
image correlation, phase matching, or skeleton matching approach. See Jain et al., supra note 191, at 39 ("Most

fingerprint-matching algorithms adopt one of four approaches: image correlation, phase matching, skeleton
matching, and minutiae matching"). These approaches are much more commonly used outside the fingerprint
matching context. "Today's state-of-the-art (SOTA) AFIS systems, like all automated SOTA pattern matching
systems, employ computational neural networks of various types. Due to the cost of AFIS systems, [though,] the
transition from the installed base to SOTA capabilities will be slow." E-mail from James Loudermilk, supra note
58.
320. See Jain et al., supra note 191, at 39 (stating that algorithm designers adopt the minutiae-based approach because "forensic examiners have successfully relied on minutiae to match fingerprints for more than a
century"). But see supra Section IV.A (explaining that fingerprint examiners have potentially high error rates,

suggesting that their examinations of minutiae in assessing whether fingerprints match may not be so successful
after all).
321. See Jain et al., supra note 191, at 39-40 (stating that algorithm designers adopt the minutiae-based
approach because "expert testimony about suspect identity based on mated minutiae is admissible in courts of
law").
322.

See id. at 39 (stating that algorithm designers adopt the minutiae-based approach because "minutiae-

based representation is storage efficient").
323.

See Abu-Faraj et al., supra note 318, at 299 ("The performance of a minutiae-extraction-algorithm

relies heavily on the quality of the input fingerprint image."). Resolution of the fingerprint images is central to
accuracy. Andrea R. Roddy & Jonathan D. Stosz, FingerprintFeatures-StatisticalAnalysis andSystem Performance Estimates, 85 PROCEEDINGS OF THE IEEE 1390, 1416 (1997). As Jain et al. explain, "Latent fingerprints
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sometimes compromised by the print being lifted off a moist or dirty surface, or
an image recorded off of a complex background, where it is difficult to distinguish between the friction ridges and, for example, a design on the background. 324 More broadly, low quality may result from smudges, partial prints, or

even low-resolution image capture techniques. 325 According to Jain et al., "A
typical good-quality fingerprint image contains about 20-70 minutiae points; the

actual number depends on the size of the sensor surface and how the user places
his or her finger on the sensor." 326
Performance also depends on the system's ability to find corresponding minutiae in different prints despite the print deformation that results from the plasticity of the finger and other factors. 327 The automated systems deal with this
complication by building in an allowance for the particular feature's location and
particulars. 328 Thus, performance of these matching programs is based on the
selected tolerance for false positives and negatives. 329 The size of the area in
which the program searches for a particular feature or minutia-known as X, or
the "feature" or "search" area-affects the allowance for print deformation under
various conditions. 330 A large X provides more room in which the program can

find minutiae that were displaced as a result of movement like a rotation or nonlinear distortion resulting from finger plasticity. 331 The greater this allowance,
meaning the greater the search area, translates into a greater likelihood of false
positives and a smaller likelihood of false negatives. 332 Depending on the reason
the program is being used, there might be a greater or lesser tolerance for false
positives and negatives. 333 For example, one might accept more false positives

for gaining access to an iPhone than for obtaining evidence on which to base a
criminal conviction. 334 In the case of the iPhone, the risks stemming from false
generally suffer from low image quality, small overlapping area, and nonlinear distortion as well as the presence
of a complex background." Jain et al., supra note 191, at 42.
324.

See Jain et al., supra note 191, at 42. Indeed, performance depends on additional factors such as envi-

ronmental conditions like temperature and humidity, the characteristics of the sensor recording the images, and
the number and demographic distribution of the population whose prints are included as exemplars in the relevant
database. See id. at 41.
325. See id. at 41-42.
326. Id. at 38.
327.

See Roddy & Stosz, supra note 323, at 1395 ("The distance between two features can change signifi-

cantly due to plasticity of the finger."); supra Section IV.C (discussing the biomechanics of touch involved in
fingerprinting).
328.

See Roddy & Stosz, supra note 323, at 1395 ("[A]utomated matching requires accommodation of phe-

nomena such as plasticity and distortion; therefore, parameters such as search areas are built in to allow a degree
of flexibility in feature detection.").
329. See Jain et al., supra note 191, at 40-41; Roddy & Stosz, supra note 323, at 1395.
330. See Roddy & Stosz, supra note 323, at 1395.
331. See id.
332. See id.
333. See Jain et al., supra note 191, at 41.
334. Jain et al. use the example of comparing the risks of false positives and negatives in the contexts of
gaining access to an ATM and entrance to Disney World: "[T]he required [false match rate] and [false nonmatch
rate] depend on the specific application-for example, Disney World's fingerprint-based entry system operates

at a low [false nonmatch rate], so as not to upset paying customers, at the expense of a higher [false nonmatch
rate]. On the other hand, an ATM fingerprint verification system may require low [false match rate] at the expense
of higher [false nonmatch rate]." Id.
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negatives are high because, if the correct user is routinely barred from gaining
access to the device, that user will likely become frustrated and perhaps even
discard the iPhone and purchase an Android device instead. The risks related to
false positives are much lower, because very few people other than the correct
user will likely try to access the device. In the case of using computerized algorithms to obtain evidence for conviction, the risks stemming from false positives
are quite high, as a false positive could translate into depriving an innocent person of his life or liberty. The risks related to false negatives are lower, as this
would likely translate into only losing evidence for conviction. This consequence
is undesirable as well, but, consistent with the maxim that it is "better that ten
guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer," 33 5 a false negative in this
context is preferable to a false positive. "Practically, E should be large enough to
account for effects such as plasticity of the finger and deviations in feature position due to variations in the data, as well as effects of the processing algorithms,
but not large enough for areas associated with distinct features to overlap." 336
When working with latent prints, subjective human intervention is ultimately
used as a stopgap to prevent undesirable false positives. 337 It is questionable

whether human intervention is an effective prophylactic here, though, as examiners' false positive rates are potentially quite high. 338
Some algorithm-based matching systems provide similarity scores, which
depend on factors such as the number of matching minutiae, the percentage of
matching minutiae, the consistency of ridge count, and the distances and angles
between corresponding minutiae.

339

One such program, known as FRStat, has

recently been deployed in the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory at
the Department of Defense, allowing fingerprint examiners to testify in military
courts about the supposed probability that a latent print and exemplar print were
from different sources. 340 FRStat's developer, who is the former chief of the Latent Print Branch at the Defense Forensic Science Center, claims that the program
"strengthen[s] the foundations of [fingerprint] science." 34 1 But it remains unclear
how the results produced by FRStat, which are based on measuring the distances
335.

4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *352; see also supra note 190 and accompanying text.

336. Roddy & Stosz, supra note 323, at 1395.
337. See id. ("In a forensic comparison, plasticity and distortion of the finger are accounted for by human
processing, but in an automated process, tolerances such as E must be incorporated to accommodate these inherent variations.").

338.

See supra Section IV.A.

339.

See Jain et al., supranote 191, at 40 ("[T]he algorithm computes a similarity score to reflect the degree

of match between two fingerprints based on factors such as the number of matching minutiae, the percentage of
matching minutiae in the overlapping area of two fingerprints, and the consistency of ridge count between matching minutiae."); H.J. Swofford et al., A Methodfor the StatisticalInterpretationofFrictionRidge Skin Impression
Evidence: Method Development and Validation, 287 FORENSIC SCI. INT'L 113, 114-15 (2018).
340. See Nicole Wetsman, FingerprintAnalysis Could Finally Get Scientific, Thanks to a New Tool,
GIZMODO (May 15, 2018, 8:30 AM), https:/gizmodo.com/fingerprint-analysis-could-finally-get-scientific-than1825607912 (explaining how a fingerprint examiner from the Department of Defense testified about "the proba-

bility that the similarity between two fingerprints in question would be seen in two prints from the same person").
341.

Id. According to LinkedIn, the developer, Henry Swofford, is now the Program Manager at In-Q-Tel

instead. See Henry Swofford, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/in/henry-swofford-4052b633/
Apr. 7, 2020).
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and angles between minutiae in fingerprints, correspond to probabilities that two
prints were derived from the same source. 342 Although the program measures the
similarity in prints according to the underlying algorithm's understanding of sim-

ilarity, this does not necessarily translate into an assessment of the likelihood that
the prints share the same source. As one statistician has explained, "There are . .
multiple ways to establish probability scores for prints, and people may disagree
on the best approach to take." 343 Probably more accurately, there are multiple
ways to assess print similarity, depending on how that term is defined. The probability that prints share the same source, or even the probability that the prints
are identical once deformation and other permutations are accounted for, is a
more complicated question.
Algorithm performance also depends on the particular database used for the
search.344 As the number of exemplar prints in the database increases, there is an
increased chance that the system will deliver false positives, thus negatively affecting performance. 345 Considering that there are more than 120 million individuals' prints in the federal government's database, for example, the effect on
performance because of this factor could be significant. 346 Additionally, although there seems to be little to no research on the point, it is reasonable to believe that, if the database is narrow with respect to demographic distribution,
there would be an increased chance that the prints would be more similar to each
other, making the differentiation of prints more difficult. This would similarly
negatively affect the system's performance.347 Using large databases is also
computationally demanding, posing another challenge to apply computerized
348
matching algorithms in the fingerprint context.

Considering all these factors, there is wide variability in the accuracy of
computerized algorithms when used to match latent prints to exemplar ones.
Some of the best programs in this regard are recorded as having an accuracy of
about 54% (or 58% for VeriFinger). 349 This is in contrast to an accuracy score

of about

342.

99% when

used for identification

under more

controlled

Cf Wetsman, supra note 340 (reporting that FRStat "isn't a perfect solution to the issues with pattern

evidence," because "[p]rograms like FRStat can't create empirical certainty around fingerprint analysis" and
noting that "[t]here are . . . multiple ways to establish probability scores for prints, and people may disagree on
the best approach to take").
343. See id.
344. See Jain et al., supra note 191, at 40-41.
345.

See id. at 40; see also Medina-P6rez et al., supra note 316, at 856 ("Accuracy when very large back-

ground databases are employed is a further challenge in latent fingerprint identification. Typical latent searches
for law enforcement agencies are made on background databases with millions of fingerprints.").
346.

See E-mail from James Loudermilk, supra note 58; cf Medina-P6rez et al., supra note 316, at 851

("IAFIS . .. houses records of approximately 73 million known criminal subjects [and] receives an average of
700 latent search requests per day from authorized law enforcement agencies.").
347.

See Jain et al., supranote 191, at 41 (suggesting that a computerized algorithm's performance depends

in part on "the number and demographic distribution of the population enrolled in the system").
348. See Abu-Faraj et al., supra note 318, at 300 ("Automatic fingerprint identification is computationally
demanding, especially when large databases are considered.").
349.

See Medina-P6rez et al., supra note 316, at 851; see also id. ("The accuracy of algorithms used in latent

fingerprint identification is moderate (54.0% rank-1 identification performance when tested on a large fingerprint
database).").
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circumstances-in situations not involving latent print matching. 350 Indeed, "a

good verification algorithm is not necessarily good for identification"; 3 51 instead,
latent print matching requires greater acumen from the matching program, which

is difficult to achieve. 3 52
Ultimately, all these problems make a computerized approach to fingerprint
matching so difficult that "current automated fingerprint identification systems
require extensive manual intervention in latent encoding (feature extraction) and
in verifying a candidate list returned by the system." 353 Moreover, many experts
suggest that human matching is superior to these computerized matching programs where latent prints are involved.354 Not coincidentally, for fingerprint

matching conclusions to be entered into evidence in court, the rules generally
require the expertise of a testifying fingerprint examiner.355

Great leaps forward in existing computerized matching programs will be
necessary for accurate match determinations between latent and exemplar prints.
Although researchers have been working on improving this technology, 3 56 there
is still much to do.
A major obstacle for advancement in this area is the proprietary nature of
much of the work. Companies researching and developing computerized algorithmic approaches to fingerprint matching understandably want to keep the details of their technology secret so that they can continue profiting off of their
work. For example, the FBI makes use of technology from IDEMIA. 357 But even
the FBI does not have access to the underlying algorithm and source code that
produces the closest fingerprintmatches on which FBI fingerprint examiners rely
in beginning their match assessments. 358 This shroud of secrecy also prevents
350. See id. (comparing the moderate accuracy of computerized matching algorithms when applied to latent
prints to "the high accuracy (99.0%) of algorithms used with rolled/plain impressions").
351. Id. at 852.
352. Medina-P6rez et al. explain that this "is why the current tendency is to create specific algorithms for
latent fingerprint identification." Id.
353.

Jain et al., supra note 191, at 42. One expert has suggested that "industry research reflects comparable

performance between manual and auto-encoding" but that "the latent examiner community has been reluctant to
embrace automated encoding." E-mail from James Loudermilk, supra note 58.
354. See id. at44 ("Although fingerprint recognition is one ofthe earliest applications ofpattern recognition,
the accuracy of state-of-the-art fingerprint-matching systems is still not comparable to human fingerprint experts
in many situations, particularly latent print matching."); see also Medina-P6rez et al., supra note 316, at 852

("Some authors conclude, not surprisingly, that the accuracy of latent fingerprint identification is better when the
features are extracted by human experts.").
355. See Jain et al., supra note 191, at 39-42; cf STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 1, at 139
("Although some . . AFIS[s] .. . permit fully automated identification of fingerprint records related to criminal
history (e.g., for screening job applicants), the assessment of latent prints from crime scenes is based largely on
human interpretation.").

356.

See, e.g., Abu-Faraj et al., supra note 318, at 299 (developing an automatic fingerprint identification

system that is more cost-effective and reliable than others); Medina-P6rez et al., supra note 316, at 852-53 (pro-

posing a novel clustering algorithm to match latent prints).
357. See MorphoTrak Chosen as Biometric Providerfor FBI Next Generation Identification Program,
SAFRAN: MORPHO (Sept. 8, 2009), https://web.archive.org/web/20141119030554/http://www.morpho.com/actualites-et-evenements/presse/morphotrak-chosen-as-biometric-provider-for-fbi-next-generation-identificationprogram.
358.

The secrecy about the program's details, and the questions about accuracy that secrecy raises, is trou-

blesome. See generally Meghan J. Ryan, Secret Conviction Programs, 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 269 (2020)
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outside researchers from examining-and criticizing-the computer algorithm
and source code implementing it. 359 It is also often difficult for researchers to
gain access to even just the results produced by these matching programs, as
access to these programs can be expensive.360 Without transparency, there are
real questions about the extent to which fingerprint matching algorithms are actually useful.

Another significant hurdle slowing advances in the development of computerized matching algorithms is the dearth of adequate databases on which to
test matching programs. 361 Access to large databases of latent and exemplar
prints, where known matches and mismatches exist, is essential. 362 But most databases are insufficient in one way or another. 363 Some databases are too small,
and others are based on prints that have been matched by examiners so the
ground truth of whether prints actually match is unknown. 364 For example, one

particular database that researchers have historically used for computerized algorithm evaluation and that has been described as a "popular public database
employed in most of the published literature" is NIST SD27. 365 The database
contains just 258 latent and exemplar print matches, and those matches are not
actually known but are instead matches as determined by fingerprint examiners. 366 Further, this database was removed by NIST in January 2018, and is no

longer publicly available. 367 Lack of availability is a broader problem, too. Some
databases are proprietary, so researchers lack access to them, and others are too
expensive to allow researchers ready access. 368 Researchers' lack of access to
databases on which to test new computerized matching algorithms is slowing
progress on improving fingerprint matching overall.

Finally, to further the fingerprint matching enterprise, researchers and funding sources need to focus on improving computerized algorithms so that they are
up to the task of matching latent and exemplar prints and also quantifying differences between prints that translate into true probabilities that the latent and
(laying out the difficulties that these secrecy and the concomitant accuracy concerns pose). The secrecy and
accuracy issues may even rise to the level of constitutional concern. See id. at 329-41.

359. See id. at 330.
360. See Abu-Faraj et al., supra note 318, at 299.
361. See id.; Medina-P6rez et al., supra note 316, at 862 (noting that "public benchmarks for comparing the
algorithms are scarce and small").
362. See Abu-Faraj et al., supra note 318, at 300.
363.

See Medina-P6rez et al., supra note 316, at 862 ("[P]ublic benchmarks for comparing ...

algorithms

are scarce and small .... "). For a taste of how algorithm developers employ various databases, see Swofford et
al., supra note 339, at 118 (describing five different databases on which the authors tested FRStat).
364. See Medina-P6rez et al., supra note 316, at 862.
365. Id. at 856.
366. See id.
367.
See NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., NIST SPECIAL DATABASE SD27/27A, https://www.nist.gov/
iti/iad/image-group/nist-special-database-2727a (last visited Apr. 7, 2020). The NIST website provides:
It has been determined that this dataset lacks the documentation required by NIST for distribution. This
dataset has been withdrawn and is no longer available for purchase or download from NIST. NIST regrets
any inconvenience from the withdrawal of this dataset. NIST researchers are working to replace the withdrawn data as quickly as possible.
Id. The message was posted on January 30, 2018. Id.

368.

See Abu-Faraj et al., supra note 318, at 299; Medina-P6rez et al., supra note 316, at 862.
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exemplar prints are, accounting for permutations due to deformation and other
characteristics, identical. This figure, paired with research on the uniqueness of
prints, could then be translated into probability assessments that the latent and
exemplar print were derived from the same source. Concentrating on developing
large, publicly available databases that contain known latent and exemplar
matching prints is also key to advancing computerized matching algorithms that
can provide a more objective and scientific approach to fingerprint matching in
the future.
V.

CONCLUSION

Researching the uniqueness of fingerprints, the biomechanics of touch, and
computerized matching algorithms is essential to building a scientific foundation
for fingerprint evidence. And further investigating the accuracy and reliability of
fingerprint examiners' current methods could also be helpful. This research is
key in providing courts with an avenue by which they can dig themselves out of
the existing fingerprint crisis. Countless men and women across the nation have
been convicted based on fingerprint evidence, 369 and judges and jurors continue
to reach guilty verdicts every day based on this evidence. Yet it remains unclear
whether and to what extent this evidence is accurate and reliable, or whether
fingerprint evidence is entirely useless. 370 Still, prosecutors continue to base
their cases on this shaky evidence, and judges continue to admit it. 371 Courts'
hesitancy to exclude fingerprint evidence at trial is based on the evidence's long
historical pedigree and perhaps the notion that the whole justice system could
collapse if it were determined that fingerprint evidence is inaccurate or unreliable.
But we certainly cannot continue convicting individuals based on questionable
evidence. For these reasons, it is crucial to determine whether the practice of
fingerprint matching can actually produce accurate and reliable evidence or, rather, whether the practice is pure junk science. Research by scientists working
with lawyers is the key to discovering the answer and leading the way out of this
crisis.

369.

See supra Section II.A.

370.

See STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 1, at 142-45.

371.

See supra Section III.B.

